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ABSTRACT 
 
      My dissertation primarily investigates the causal impact of economic inequality on marriage 
formation.  I demonstrate how economic inequality among men affects an individual woman’s 
propensity to get married in both the U.S. and China.  Based on the framework of Loughran (2002) 
and Gould and Paserman (2003), I identify the causal impact of male wage inequality on the 
marriage propensity among women in the U.S. using the 1990 and 2000 Censuses as well as the 
2007 American Community Survey.  I address the endogeneity and reverse causality problems by 
applying skill-biased technological shock as an instrument for the wage gap between high and low 
educated men following the example of Mocan and Unel (2011).  I discover that a low educated 
woman’s marriage propensity becomes lower but a high educated woman’s marriage propensity 
becomes higher when there is an increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men. 
Additionally, I examine whether in China the income inequality among men affects female marital 
decision-making by utilizing the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS).  I find that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the Gini coefficient of male income is associated with an increase 
in the probability of being “ever married” by 5.8 percentage points for urban women and by 6.9 
percentage points for rural women aged 20 to 34 from 1989 to 2009. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
         
        Economists care about marriage formation because marriage forms the basis for the basic 
unit of society, the family.  The propensity of young adults to get married is naturally associated 
with women’s fertility choices and children’s development as well as people’s decisions and 
outcomes in the labor market.  Pioneered by Becker (1973), the causes of marriage formation 
trends have been widely discussed.   
        There have been dramatic changes in family formation across the world in the last several 
decades.  Particularly, fewer Americans are getting married today compared with those in the 
previous 6 to 7 decades (Greenstone and Looney 2012).  The percentage of married households 
among all types of households has dropped from more than 75% in the 1940s to less than 50% in 
the 2010s based on the statistical results from the U.S. Census Bureau.1  On the other side of the 
world, the economic liberalization policies2 in China have challenged traditional Chinese values 
and concepts of family during the last 30 years.  With the ending of the institution of arranged 
marriage 3, marriage formation in China is beginning to reflect similar traits as those of western 
countries.   
        Not just differences in marriage formation but changes in economic inequality have also 
caught researchers’ attention.  There is an ongoing trend of rising economic inequality in recent 
decades in both the U.S. and China (Yang 1998; Gustafsson and Li 2002; Meng 2004; Autor, 
Katz and Kearney 2008).  Studies have linked the rising earning inequality to factors such as 
globalization, technological changes and other changes in the labor institutes (Leamer 1996; 
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1996; Acemoglu 1998; Card and 
DiNardo 2002).   Most of these factors are not in the control of individuals.  The rising earning 
inequality has severe consequences on the society, such as more crime and lower 
happiness/satisfaction in daily life (Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002; Mocan and Unel 2011).  
Although people in the labor market with lower earnings seem to marry less (Greenstone and 
Looney 2012), we are not certain of whether and why there is a causal impact of economic 
inequality on marriage formation. 
        This dissertation contributes to existing literature by showing how economic inequality 
affects marriage formation.  I put together two essays to present evidence from the U.S. and 
China respectively.  Both essays approach this problem by exploring the impact of earning 
inequality among men on the propensity of women to get married.    
        This approach originates from the literature that links female marital decision-making to 
male wage inequality in the U.S. (Loughran 2002; Gould and Paserman 2003).  They find that 
women will delay marriage under a higher male wage inequality.  This is because a woman 
usually has a “reservation wage”, the minimum acceptable wage of her potential partner during 
her marital search.  The level of the “reservation wage” becomes higher when male wage 
inequality becomes larger in a U.S. metropolitan area in a year.  However, the endogeneity and 
reverse causality problems in identifying the causal impact have not yet been fully 
                                                          
    
1See Table HH-1. Households, by Type: 1940 to Present at www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/households.html  
2A nation-wide reform and opening up campaign was launched by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978.  
It is aimed to transit a highly centralized planned economic system to an innovative socialist market economic 
system, and transmit the closed or semi-closed state to a fully opened state to the outside world.  
    
3 Since the enactment of 1950 “Marriage Law”, arranged marriage has been abandoned in China. 
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addressed.  Neither is there evidence from other parts of the world to support these results (Kuo 
2008). 
        Therefore, in this dissertation, I extend their research in two directions.  In the next chapter, 
I identify the causal impact of male wage inequality on American women’s marriage propensity 
by applying the instrumental variable method.  I use skill-biased technological change as the 
instrument for male wage inequality.  Male wage inequality is measured by the wage ratio 
between high educated (with some college education or higher) men and low educated (with high 
school degree or lower) men.  Based on the data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses as well 
as the 2007 American Community Survey, I find that an increase in the wage gap between high 
and low educated men decreases the marriage propensity among low educated women and it 
increases the marriage propensity among high educated women. The same results are found in 
white or non-white women samples.  In general, the findings could explain about 1/5 of the 
marriage trends in broad educational groups for women in the past 20 years.  Two views help 
explain the mechanism behind the results.  One is from the assortative mating by education, 
which states high educated women usually match with high educated men, while low educated 
women usually match with low educated men.  The other is consistent with Watson and 
McLanahan (2011).  They find that people have a tendency to compare expected household 
income after marriage with the median household income in the metropolitan area to decide 
whether to get married within a year.  
        In the third chapter, I examine the impact of male income inequality on the marriage 
propensity among urban and rural women in China.  I adopt data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS).  I find that Chinese women aged from 20 to 34 are more likely to be 
married in an urban city or a rural county4 with a higher male income inequality.  The result is 
conditional on a woman’s personal characteristics including age and education and marriage 
market features such as the sex ratio between men and women.  It is stronger for rural women 
than for urban women, for elder women than for younger women and for lower educated women 
than for higher educated women.  It is robust under different measurements and specifications.  It 
is also true by using overall income inequality in the city or county.  Similar effects are found for 
men.  I further provide two explanations for these results.  First of all, when there is higher 
income inequality among men, especially under polarized income distribution, it is more likely 
to meet partners with income exceeding the reservation value, which is women’s expected 
standard on male income in marital search.  In addition, higher income inequality raises income 
risk and uncertainty of the society.  Hence, with an inadequate social security system, higher 
income inequality in a city/county makes marriage more attractive to both young women and 
young men in China, especially in rural areas.  
        Finally, in the last chapter, I summarize and contrast the findings in both essays and further 
point out the implication of these results.  Before starting the first essay, I have to clarify that in 
both U.S. and China, marriage formation has never been only attributed to certain financial 
aspects.  The discussion of all the aspects that affect marriage is out of the scope of this study.  
Instead, this dissertation solely focuses on the impact of earning inequality on the propensity to 
marry.  Not only that, the assumption of the rationality of man may be easily violated in the 
marriage formation process, as marital decision-making could be highly emotional and involve 
                                                          
    4 “Province, Prefectures, Counties and Townships” is the basic four-level administrative division of China.  The 
“county” or formally “county level division” in China is the third level administrative hierarchy.  A “city” in China 
can be a province-level municipality, a prefecture-level city and a county-level city.  In this study, there are samples 
from cities in urban area and from counties in rural area.    
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many factors such as “love”, “personality” and “culture” that are hard to quantify.  Consequently, 
the conclusion in this paper is only about one determinant in the marriage formation and does not 
necessarily apply to any particular person.  
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CHAPTER 2. SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, MALE WAGE 
INEQUALITY AND FEMALE MARITAL DECISION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
        This paper investigates whether male wage inequality affects female marriage propensity in 
the U.S.  An increase in the male wage inequality is associated with a decrease in female 
marriage propensity (Loughran 2002; Gould and Paserman 2003).  Theoretically, a woman 
searches for a husband based on the wage distribution of men conditional on other male 
characteristics.  When male wage inequality increases, due to a higher expected benefit to 
continue the marital search, the woman forms a higher “reservation wage”, which is defined as 
the minimum acceptable wage level of the potential husband as in the “job search theory”.  A 
higher “reservation wage” reduces the probability for the woman to meet a qualified mate, and 
hence delays marriage.    
        Current research however cannot identify the causal impact due to the difficulty in 
addressing endogeneity and reverse causality problems.  For instance, some unobserved 
socioeconomic changes in a metropolitan area such as earning instability and/or income mobility 
may change both male wage inequality (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994) and female marriage 
propensity (Hess 2004).  The converse may be true: as the propensity to get married among 
women changes, the number of married and single men in the metropolitan area also changes.  
This magnifies male wage inequality, since married men usually earn a wage premium by virtue 
of being married (Ahituv and Lerman 2007).  Previous studies only address these problems by 
controlling for the metropolitan area fixed effect, year fixed effect and the metropolitan area 
specific year trends (Loughran 2002; Gould and Paserman 2003; Kuo 2008).   
        In order to identify the causal impact, I instrument male wage inequality with skill-biased 
technological change.  Skill-biased technological change has compounded the wage gap between 
high and low educated men since the late 1970s in the U.S. (Card and DiNardo 2002; Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney 2008).  However, general skill-biased technological change in a metropolitan 
area cannot determine a woman’s marriage decision unless through the change of male wage 
inequality after controlling for her personal characteristics including race, age, education and 
occupation.   
        To facilitate the application of this instrument, I measure male wage inequality using the 
wage gap between high and low educated men5.  Loughran (2002) and Gould and Paserman 
(2003) emphasize the role of wage inequality between men within the same educational group 
rather than the wage gap between high and low educated men in explaining female marriage 
propensity.  Recently, through simulation, Watson and McLanahan (2011) find that couples 
compare their expected household income with the median household income in their own 
metropolitan area (“norm”) in deciding to get married.  Specifically, a lower expected household 
income compared with the “norm” usually discourages a couple from marriage, and vice versa.  
A larger wage gap between high and low educated men indicates a relatively lower wage for low 
educated men in general compared with the median wage of all men, and the opposite holds true 
for high educated men.  Combined with the fact that women usually associate with men in the 
same broad educational group (Browning, Chiappory, and Weiss 2011), low educated women 
                                                          
    
5
 In this paper, high educated (skilled) is always defined as with some college or more education and low 
educated (skilled) otherwise.  
5 
 
are generally less likely to marry conditional on their own earnings, while the opposite should 
happen for high educated women.  
        Consistent with this prediction, I find that an increase in the wage gap between high and 
low educated men decreases the propensity of low educated women to get married, and increases 
the propensity of high educated women to get married.  I use data from the 1990 5% and the 
2000 5% U.S. Censuses as well as the 2007 1% American Community Survey (ACS).  The result 
indicates that the roughly 10% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men 
from 1990 to 2007 decreases the rate of low educated women who have been married among all 
low educated women by at least 4.03 percentage points and increases that for high educated 
women by at least 2.26 percentage points for women aged 21 to 35 across 212 U.S. metropolitan 
areas.  It accounts for about 22% (4.03%/18%) of the actual decline (18%) in the marriage rate 
among low educated women.  And without the effect of a greater wage gap between high and 
low educated men, the marriage rate decline among high educated women (12%) would have 
been almost 19% (2.26%/12%) higher. 
        Similar to Gould and Paserman (2003), I control for female personal characteristics such as 
age, race, and education, the sex ratio in specific racial and educational group, and the 
metropolitan area fixed effects as well as the metropolitan area specific time trends.  I construct 
the instrument following an example from Mocan and Unel (2011), where they instrument low 
educated men’s wage with skill-biased technological change to explain the propensity to conduct 
crime.  I check the robustness with alternative variable measures and by further controlling for 
the woman’s occupation.  I also divide sample by race.  The results can also apply for white and 
non-white women separately.  After adding the number of prisoners in a state in each year as an 
additional control, the effects of the male wage gap on female marriage propensity still exist but 
are generally reduced.  Hence, I cannot exclude the possibility that wage gap between high and 
low educated men alters people’s propensity to conduct crime which interacts with women’s 
propensity to get married. 
        The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: Section 2.2 review the literature on general 
determinants of female marriage propensity and specifically the effect of the male wage 
inequality or the wage gap between high and low educated men on female marriage propensity.  
In Section 2.3, I explain the usage of skill-biased technological change as an instrument for the 
wage gap between high and low educated men.  Section 2.4 introduces the data and the 
estimation sample.  In Section 2.5, I describe the empirical methodology, while Section 2.6 
presents the estimation results, interpretation and robustness checks.  Section 2.7 concludes this 
chapter. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
        In this section, I review previous research examining the determinants of female marriage 
propensity.  I focus on the literature linking male wage inequality to female marriage propensity. 
I also introduce studies that imply a correlation of the wage gap between high and low educated 
men with female marital decision-making. 
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2.2.1 Effect of Traditional Factors on Female Marriage Propensity 
 
        From an economic perspective, Becker (1973) was the first to study when and why women 
get married.  Under his framework, researchers have been investigating the factors that 
determine women’s marriage decisions.  As he observed, women estimate the net benefit of 
marriage in choosing between singlehood and marriage.  Women with different socioeconomic 
conditions have different preferences toward marriage; most directly, a woman’s characteristics, 
for example: age, race, education and wage, affect her own marriage decision.   
        To be specific, the propensity to marry increases as a woman gets older.  White women are 
more likely to get married than non-white women.  Women may delay their first marriage due to 
school enrollment, military service, or prolonged cohabitation (Coale 1992; Oppenheimer 1994, 
2003; Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz 1996; Goldin and Katz 2002).  Women may also have later or 
fewer marriages as they become more economically independent, where economic independence 
can be reflected in increased labor force participation, higher education, and improved earnings 
(Santow and Bracher 1994; Oppenheimer 1997; Okun 2001; Raymo 2003).  However, women 
with higher education and improved financial condition bring more benefit to a marriage union, 
which may also make it easier for them to get married (Hess 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).   
        A woman’s marital decision is also affected by marriage market conditions. A marriage 
market can be viewed as the pool of prime-aged men and women in a particular area in a year.  
The easier it is to meet a desirable mate in a marriage market, the more likely it is for a woman to 
get married.  The marriage rate of young women increases, given a higher sex ratio, which is 
calculated by the number of prime age men over women in a metropolitan area in a year 
(Muhsam 1974; Schoen 1983; Oppenheimer 1988; Angrist 2002).  Similarly, a woman is more 
likely to marry with a higher sex ratio in her specific living, working, or studying environment, 
more frequent marital search, and the improvement of transportation or telecommunication tools 
in the local area (Oppenheimer 1988; Xu, Qiang and Wang 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).   
 
2.2.2 Effect of Male Wage Inequality on Female Marriage Propensity 
 
        Besides all of the previously discussed factors, male financial condition also has a 
noticeable impact on the female marital decision.  A number of studies have shown that a lack of 
financially attractive men reduces the marriage rate among young women (Becker 1981; Wilson 
1987; Lichter, LeClere, and McLaughlin 1991; Litcher et al. 1992).  Most of these papers use the 
absolute value of wage or income to measure a man’s financial attractiveness.  Nevertheless, 
they imply that the wage comparison among men also matters for a woman’s marital decision.   
        Specifically, recent studies show that male wage inequality affects female marital decisions.  
They explore the role of male wage inequality during the process of a female marital search.  
During marital search, a woman searches for a suitable husband among men with different wages 
conditional on other male characteristics.  Generally speaking, women need to spend more time 
to select a proper mate when income levels among men become more diverse and differentiated 
in a marriage market (Becker 1974; Keeley 1977).  The longer search delays marriage.  In 
addition, as Loughran (2002) points out, when male wage inequality is higher, women also tend 
to be more discriminating in male wages.  Based on the work of Mortensen (1986), he argues 
that as the distribution of male wage becomes fatter tailed, a woman forms a higher standard on 
the minimum male wage she can accept in order to get married, in other words, a higher 
“reservation wage”.  With a higher reservation wage, the probability to meet someone exceeding 
7 
 
this new “reservation wage” becomes smaller if the distribution of the male wage is well shaped 
with more mass in the center than the tails.  Hence, a higher reservation wage normally will lead 
to later and fewer marriages.  
        This reservation wage mechanism can be used to explain the empirical results found in the 
U.S.  A higher male wage inequality, especially within a certain educational and racial group, 
delays marriages for women in the same educational and racial group in a metropolitan area 
(Loughran 2002; Gould and Paserman 2003; Coughlin and Drewianka 2011).  However, in 
Taiwan, the effect is very small and insignificant (Kuo 2008).  These studies usually measure 
wage inequality with the standard deviation of male wage among men of a certain educational 
and racial group, or that among all men.  Alternative measures such as “Gini coefficient”, “90/50” 
or “50/10” ratio are tested in the robustness checks.     
        However, these empirical studies have difficulties in claiming a causal relationship, since 
they are facing unobserved heterogeneity and reverses causality problems (Gould and Paserman 
2003).  There can be uncontrolled factors that affect both the male wage inequality and female 
propensity to marry.  One example is the earning instability: higher earning instability increases 
the variance of short-term “transitory” change in earnings, and can account for a higher wage 
inequality in a certain year (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994).  Higher wage instability may reflect 
higher job mobility in a metropolitan area.  As changes in job positions and earnings are more 
frequent, marriage may become harder to establish.  In this sense, earning instability is also 
associated with fewer marriages.  It is also possible, however, that an earning instability can 
promote marriage.  For instance, women may get married in order to obtain more social supports 
or share financial risk when there is greater financial instability in society (Hess 2004).  As a 
result, earning instability, for which is hard to control, causes an unobserved heterogeneity 
problem.   
        Besides, there can be reverse causality.  It is reasonable to doubt that wage inequality 
among men is affected by female marriage propensity.  The effect can be through the “wage 
premium” for married men (Korenman and Neumar 1991; Chun and Lee 2001; Ahituv and 
Lerman 2007).  As female marriage rates change in a metropolitan area over a period, the 
numbers of married and single men also change.  This also leads to different levels of male wage 
inequality.   Therefore, through “wage premium” effect, marriage propensities among women 
affect the wage inequality among men. 
 
2.2.3 Effect of Wage Gap between High and Low Educated Men on Female Marriage Propensity 
 
        Previous papers mainly address the endogeneity and reverse causality by adding 
metropolitan fixed effects and metropolitan-specific time trends.  In this paper, in addition to 
controlling for these effects, I use skill-biased technological change as an instrument for male 
wage inequality.  To apply this instrument, I use the wage gap between high and low educated 
men as the measure for male wage inequality.   
        Two phenomena together could explain why the wage gap between high and low educated 
men affects the female marital decision-making.  Firstly, the comparison of expected household 
income after marriage with the median household income of all families within a metropolitan 
area in a year is important in a couple’s decision to marry.  If the expected household income is 
below the median, the couple is less likely to marry and vice versa.  In addition, if it is become 
further above or closer to the median (if not above), the couple are more likely to marry (Watson 
and McLanahan 2011).  Accordingly, one can predict that, conditional on a woman’s own 
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earnings, a woman is less (or more) likely to get married with a partner whose wage is further 
below (or above) the median male wage in a metropolitan area in a year.  Therefore, as the wage 
gap between high and low educated men is magnified, the average income of all low (or high) 
educated men is further away from the median wage of all men.  Therefore, women who match 
with low educated men become less likely to marry, while women who match with high 
educated men become more likely to marry. 
        Secondly, there is assortative mating by education meaning that people usually match with 
others of similar education.  Economists usually explain the economic logic of assortative mating 
by “transfer utility model” under the framework of Becker’s “bilateral match theory” (Choo and 
Siow 2006; Seitz, Siow and Choo 2008; Siow 2009).  Empirically, educational assortative 
mating in U.S. has been prevalent for some time (Mare 1991; Pencavel 1998; Lowis and 
Oppenheimer 2000; Browning et al. 2011).   
        Therefore, the wage gap between high and low educated men can affect marriage propensity 
among low and high educated women.  We predict that, conditional on the median male wage, 
low educated women are less likely to get married as wages of low educated men on average are 
further below the median male wage; whereas high educated women are more likely to get 
married as wages of high educated men on average are further above the median male wage.  
        There are still endogeneity and reverse causality problems to be addressed using the wage 
gap between high and low educated men as a measure for male wage inequality.  Generally 
speaking, unobserved or uncontrolled factors that cause endogeneity for overall male wage 
inequality can cause similar problems for the wage gap between high and low educated men.  To 
solve these problems, I instrument the wage gap between high and low educated men with an 
index for skill-biased technological change.   
 
2.3 Instrument 
        I use a measure of skill-biased technological change as the instrument for the wage gap 
between high and low educated men.  Skill-biased technological change is one of the main 
drivers of the wage gap between high and low educated workers (Card and DinNardo 2002; 
Autor et al. 2008).  Skill-biased technological change increases the relative demand for high 
educated workers over low educated workers, and thus leads to a higher wage ratio between high 
and low educated workers (Autor et al. 2008; Acemoglu and Autor 2010).  This explains the 
persistent increase in the wage gap between high and low educated workers since the late 1970s, 
despite of a large increase in the relative supply of high educated workers over low educated 
workers.  Mocan and Unel (2011) provide a detailed explanation on the usage of skill-biased 
technological change as an instrument for wage of low educated workers to explain the 
propensity for crime.  I construct the instrument based mainly on their paper. 
        An index of skill-biased technological change can be interpreted from a CES production 
function with inputs of both high skilled and low skilled workers, given the relative supply and 
the relative wage of high skilled and low skilled workers.  Specifically, consider a CES 
production function (2.1), where high or low educated workers are imperfect substitutes.   
 
(2.1)  𝑌 = [(𝐴𝐿𝐿)
𝜎−1
𝜎 + (𝐴𝐻𝐻)
𝜎−1
𝜎 ]
𝜎
𝜎−1
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        In the function (2.1), 𝐻 and 𝐿 represent the efficiency-adjusted labor inputs from high and 
low skilled workers respectively, while 𝐴𝐻  and 𝐴𝐿  denote the respective factor-augmenting 
technology terms for high and low skill labor.  The parameter σ represents the elasticity of 
substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.  A skill-neutral technological change 
increase 𝐴𝐻 and 𝐴𝐿 by the same amount which can be reflected by σ = 1 in the model, whereas a 
skill-biased technological change will increase 𝐴𝐻 more than 𝐴𝐿 and hence increase the value of 
𝐴𝐻 𝐴𝐿⁄ .  As a result, there is σ > 1 under the assumption of skill-biased technological change 
(Acemoglu 1998; Autor et al. 2008). 
        Based on this production function, we can obtain the relationship among relative wage, 
relative supply and relative demand for high skilled workers compared with low skill workers.  
Assuming that the labor markets are competitive, low or high skill workers’ unit wage equals the 
value of marginal product of low or high skill workers respectively as shown in equation (2.2) 
and (2.3) below. 
 
(2.2)  𝜔𝐿 = 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐿 = 𝐴𝐿
𝜎−1
𝜎 [𝐴𝐿
𝜎−1
𝜎 + 𝐴𝐻
𝜎−1
𝜎 (
𝐻
𝐿
)
𝜎−1
𝜎 ]
1
𝜎−1
     
                                 
(2.3)  𝜔𝐻 = 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐻 = 𝐴𝐻
𝜎−1
𝜎 [𝐴𝐻
𝜎−1
𝜎 + 𝐴𝐿
𝜎−1
𝜎 (
𝐻
𝐿
)−
𝜎−1
𝜎 ]
1
𝜎−1
           
                              
        Then, the wage ratio between high and low skilled (educated) workers or the wage premium 
for high educated workers can be calculated as  
 
(2.4)  𝜔𝐻
𝜔𝐿
= (
𝐴𝐻
𝐴𝐿
)
𝜎−1
𝜎
(
𝐻
𝐿
)−
1
𝜎
                                                         
 
        According to equation (2.4), the change in the wage premium for high educated workers 
denoted by 𝜔𝐻 𝜔𝐿⁄  can be viewed as the result of both the change in relative supply of labor, 
mainly the value of 𝐻 𝐿⁄  , and the change in the relative demand of labor, mainly the value of  
𝐴𝐻 𝐴𝐿⁄ .  The relative supply of labor, 𝐻 𝐿⁄ , has been rising, which will drive down the wage 
premium  𝜔𝐻 𝜔𝐿⁄ .  The increase of 𝜔𝐻 𝜔𝐿⁄   over time is mainly due to the rising relative demand, 
captured by the rise of  𝐴𝐻 𝐴𝐿⁄ .  Specifically, skill-biased technological change increases the 
term 𝐴𝐻 𝐴𝐿⁄ , and drives up the relative demand of high skilled workers. 
        Accordingly, I use ln (𝐴𝐻 𝐴𝐿⁄ ) as the measure for skill-biased technological change6, the 
instrument.  I use the logarithm of the wage ratio between high and low educated male workers, 
ln (𝑤𝐻 𝑤𝐿⁄ ), to denote the wage gap between high and low educated men, the key explanatory 
variable.  Implicitly, I assume skill-biased technological change drives up the wage gap between 
high and low educated male workers in the same way as it does for all workers, male and female 
workers.   
        We observe the relative supply and relative wage of high and low skilled workers in a 
metropolitan area in a year.  Hence, the instrument measure can be backed out from equation 
(2.5).  Take the logarithm term for both sides of equation (2.4), we have  
 
(2.5)  𝑙𝑛 (𝜔𝐻
𝜔𝐿
) =
𝜎−1
𝜎
𝑙𝑛 (
𝐴𝐻
𝐴𝐿
) −
1
𝜎
𝑙𝑛 (
𝐻
𝐿
)                                                
                                                          
    6 See Mocan and Unel (2011) for more detailed explanation.  
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        Specifically, ln(𝜔𝐻 𝜔𝐿⁄  ) is calculated from wage of all full time7 workers, male and female 
aged between 17 and 65 in each metropolitan area in a year.  H and L are the total efficiency-
adjusted hours worked for high and low educated workers respectively in each metropolitan area 
in a year.  I adopt the value of σ used in Unel (2010) and Mocan and Unel (2011), where σ =
1.6.  The instrument variable, ln(𝐴𝐻 𝐴𝐿⁄ ), is calculated for each metropolitan area in each year.   
        According to the construction of the instrument, we could believe that skill-biased 
technological change certainly affects the explanatory variable of interest, the logarithm of wage 
ratio between high and low educated male workers.  But it does not affect the dependent variable, 
a woman’s decision to get married.  Consider two women with same age, education and 
occupation in the same metropolitan area.  Skill-biased technological change over time cannot 
explain why one of them gets married but the other stays single, unless it is because of the 
change in the wage gap between high and low educated men.  Therefore, skill-biased 
technological change can be a valid instrument for the wage gap between high and low educated 
men in explaining female marriage propensity, conditional on the woman’s age, education and 
occupation, as well as controlling for metropolitan area fixed effects and metropolitan area 
specific time trends. 
 
2.4 Data8 
        I use samples of the 1990 and the 2000 Censuses data as well as the 2007 ACS data9.  The 
numbers of observations are more than 12.5 million in the 1990 Census, 14.1 million in the 2000 
Census and around 3 million in the 2007 ACS.  The main variables in use are year, state, 
metropolitan area, age, sex, marital status, race, education, employment status, weeks worked, 
hour worked, income wage, occupation, personal weight and migration status.   
        Previous literature (Loughran 2002; Gould and Paserman 2003) uses samples from the 1980, 
1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses.  In my paper, I exclude 1980 Census because of severe problems 
in the constructed values of the male wage ratio and technological shock ratio, which is probably 
due to a different weight structure in 1980 Census compared with 1990 and 2000 Census10.  
However, there will be a small sample of metropolitan areas only using the 1990 and 2000 
Censuses.  I consider adding American Community Survey (ACS) samples, which are 
comparable with census samples.  Among 12 waves of ACS from 2001 to 2012, 4 waves 
including the 2001 to 2004 ACS do not have proper information in identifying metropolitan 
areas and 5 waves of ACS from 2008 to 2012 do not have a variable to indicate numbers of 
“Weeks worked last year”.  Therefore, the choices narrow down to 3 waves of ACS from 2005 to 
2007.  However, adding data from three consecutive year to two decennial censuses to calculate 
variables such as the relative efficiency ratio is problematic and the variations in technological 
                                                          
7 Workers worked full time, also called full hours full time (FHFT), are those whose weekly hours worked are 
more than 35 hours and weeks worked are more than 40 weeks,. 
    8 See Appendix A for details. 
9 CPS March data is not adopted because that the identification of metropolitan areas in the CPS March data may  
   be inconsistent for the metropolitan area with population less than 500,000, due to the large sampling variability.  
    10 1980 Census has “flat weight” which means each individual has the same personal weight value. 
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shock of three consecutive years are small.  Hence, I only use the 2007 ACS in addition to the 
1990 and 2000 Censuses, so that the year gaps are similar among the three waves of data.   
        I drop partially identified metropolitan areas with more than 30% unidentified observations 
in any wave of the 1990 5% Census, the 2000 5% Census and the 2007 ACS samples, to solve 
the partial identification problems.11  According to this criterion, in total, I drop 30 metropolitan 
areas, as well as observations without metropolitan identification code in those remaining 
metropolitan areas in each wave (see Table A.1).  There are 224 metropolitan areas (MAs) left in 
1990, 256 MAs in 2000 and 256 MAs in 2007.  I also delete individuals with personal weight 
value of 0 12 . After combining three waves, there are 212 metropolitan statistical areas 
consistently identified.  I create a panel with the 212 metropolitan areas which are consistently 
observed over three waves, 1990, 2000 and 2007.   
        The sample to estimate with includes over 689,000 women aged between 21 and 35 in the 
212 metropolitan areas over three sampled years in the U.S.  Table 2.1 presents the sample  
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for Women Aged 21-35 by Year 
Variables 
 1990  2000  2007 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Age  28.671 4.499  28.840 4.585  27.748 4.354 
Years of education  12.856 2.580  12.803 2.803  13.401 2.743 
Percentage of married  0.680 0.466  0.622 0.485  0.533 0.499 
Proportion of  white  0.823 0.382  0.810 0.392  0.826 0.379 
Sex ratio (21-40 male/21-35 
female)  1.297 0.068  1.387 0.068  1.397 0.082 
Sex ratio (low edu)  1.344 0.087  1.577 0.107  1.702 0.162 
Sex ratio (high edu)  1.265 0.077  1.233 0.076  1.194 0.107 
Sex ratio (white)  1.337 0.065  1.442 0.063  1.454 0.095 
Sex ratio (white low edu)  1.372 0.091  1.662 0.117  1.810 0.207 
Sex ratio (white high edu)  1.314 0.071  1.282 0.079  1.231 0.113 
Sex ratio (black)  1.257 0.816  1.342 1.000  1.301 0.494 
Sex ratio (black low edu)  1.391 0.988  1.680 2.976  1.580 1.009 
Sex ratio (black high edu)  1.077 0.412  1.125 1.110  1.149 0.777 
Technological shock ratio  1.212 0.459  1.156 0.500  1.530 0.548 
Wage ratio between high and 
low educated  men  1.523 0.150  1.578 1.170  1.679 0.218 
Log of wage ratio between high 
and low educated men  0.416 0.097  0.450 0.105  0.510 0.126 
Observation  254,626  235,823  153,285 
Notes: Means of technological shock ratio, wage gap between high and low educated men and its log value are 
weighted mean values over 212 metropolitan areas included in the baseline estimation in each year.  Other variable 
means are weighted mean values over individual observations.  Data are from the 1990 and 2000 5% U.S. Censuses 
as well as the 2007 1% American Community Survey. 
                                                          
11 Partially identified problem happens when PUMA (public use micro-data area) encompassed any territory 
outside a given metropolitan area, the metropolitan area households located in that PUMA do not receive the  
relevant code in METAREA.  
12 According to IPUMS, “In 1990-2000, some cases have PERWT values of 0. This is a function of the complex 
sample design used by the Census Bureau.”  There are 418 cases in 1990 and 1,758 cases in 2000. 
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statistics by year.  It presents the mean values of the main variables in the baseline regression.   
The dependent variable is marital status, either “ever married” or not, for each individual woman 
in each year.  The main explanatory variable is the constructed value of the wage gap between 
high and low educated men in each of the 212 metropolitan areas in a year.  It is the logarithm 
ratio of the average wage among high educated male workers over that among low educated 
male workers in a metropolitan area in a year, denoted by ln (𝜔𝑀𝐻 𝜔𝑀𝐿⁄ )𝑚𝑡.  The average wage 
for high or low educated male workers is calculated from the real weekly wage and salaries, 
composition-adjusted,13 for the full time high or low educated male workers aged 17 to 65.  The 
instrumental variable is the constructed value of  ln(𝐴𝐻 𝐴𝐿⁄ )𝑚𝑡 , as described in the last section. 
        Individual level variables include individual marital status, age, years of education and race.  
The means for individual level variables are the average of the variable values for women aged 
from 21 to 35 years old in each year weighted by the woman’s personal weight in the census or 
ACS.  The metropolitan area level variables include the sex ratio, the sex ratio by education and 
race, the explanatory variable and the instrumental variable in each of the 212 metropolitan areas.  
As each woman will reside in a certain metropolitan area, the means of these metropolitan area 
level variables are the average of the variable values weighted by the corresponding woman’s 
personal weight.   
        As shown in Table 2.1, the percentage of ever married women of all women aged 21 to 35 
is about 68% in 1990.  It decreases to about 62% in 2000 and further to about 53% in 2007.  The 
average age of these women is always around 29.  The proportion of white women over all 
women aged 21 to 35 is about 82%.  The average education level is about 13 years.  The average 
sex ratio of men aged 21 to 40 14 over the number of women aged 21 to 35 is 1.3 in 1990 and 
increases to 1.4 in 2000 and 2007.  It increases over time among white people, but not among 
non-white people.  The average sex ratio for low educated people increases from 1.3 in 1990 to 
1.6 in 2000 and further 1.7 in 2007.  However, it decreases for high educated people from 1.3 in 
1990 to 1.2 in 2000 and 2007.  This is consistent with the literature that finds high educated 
women start to outnumber high educated men in recent decades (Browning et al. 2011).  The 
mean value of the wage ratio between high and low educated men increases over the three 
sampled years, the increase of which is about 10%, from 1.523 in 1990 to 1.670 in 2007.  The 
logarithm values of the wage ratio between high and low educated men are used in the estimation 
as the main explanatory variable, which on average increases from 0.416 to 0.510 from 1990 to 
2007.  The mean value of the skill-biased technological change ratio also increases over time.  
        Figure 2.1 displays some basic trends of marriage rates among women aged 21 to 35 by 
education.  The data are obtained from the 1980 to 2000 5% Censuses and the 2001 to 2010 1% 
American Community Survey.  In general, the proportion of ever married women among all 
women aged 21 to 35 decreases through 1980 to 2010.  Compared to the overall decline in 
marriage rates for all women, the speed of the decline is relatively slower for high educated 
women, but faster for low educated women.  This is also true for white or non-white women 
separately.  Few studies have explained or even pointed out this phenomenon; however, it agrees 
with the prediction of the potential links between male wage gap and female marriage propensity 
discussed in the literature review.  In this paper, I suggest that a higher wage gap between high 
and low educated men increases the marriage propensity for high educated women and decreases 
                                                          
    
13
 See Appendix A.2 for the construction of composition-adjusted wage. 
    
14
 Consistent with Loughran (2002), as women usually seek men with similar or higher age for future mate, the 
sex ratio is calculated by the number of men aged 21-40 over the number of women age 21-35. 
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it for low educated women theoretically.  If this effect of wage gap between high and low 
educated men on high or low educated women is verified empirically, it could provide some 
explanation for the different speeds of marital decline for high and low educated women.   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Proportion of Women “Ever Been Married” among Women Aged 21 to 35 in the U.S. 
from 1980 to 2010 
 
Note: Each dot in the graph represents the percentage of ever married women among all women aged 21 to 35 in the 
U.S. within the defined group.  The top graph separates women by educational groups. The bottom graph separates 
women by educational and racial groups.  Data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 5% U.S. Censuses and 2001 to 
2010 1% American Community Surveys. 
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
All Low edu High edu
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
All white Low edu white High edu white
All non-white Low edu non-white High edu  non-white
14 
 
2.5 Empirical Specification 
        The propensity to marry for a woman can be expressed as a function of the wage gap 
between high and low educated men, woman’s personal characteristics, and other related 
marriage market conditions.  Hence, following the literature, I estimate the baseline model (2.6) 
specified as follows, where I instrument the main explanatory variable, the logarithm of the wage 
ratio between high and low educated men, with the measure of skill-biased technological change. 
 
(2.6)  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑛 (𝜔𝑀𝐻𝜔𝑀𝐿 )𝑚𝑡 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝑐 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒
2
𝑖𝑚𝑡
+ 𝑑 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝑒 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑚 + 𝑓 ∗
           𝑠𝑥𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝑚 + 𝑇𝑚𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡 
 
        𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡 is a dummy variable to indicate if a woman (i) is ever married in metropolitan area 
(m) in year (t).  This variable has value equal to one if the woman has ever been married 
including those “currently married, separated, divorced, or widowed” women or equal to zero if 
the woman has never been married before.   
        To explain the female marriage propensity, the key variable of interest is the wage gap 
between high and low educated men in a marriage market, 𝑙𝑛(𝜔𝑀𝐻 𝜔𝑀𝐿⁄ )𝑚𝑡, where I define a 
marriage market as a metropolitan area (m) in a year (t).  According to the mechanism discussed, 
I expect the sign of the coefficient (𝑎) is negative for low educated women and positive for high 
educated women.   
        Since a woman’s propensity to get married also depends on her personal characteristics, I 
add controls for the woman’s personal characteristics, including her age, 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑡, age squared, 
𝑎𝑔𝑒2
𝑖𝑚𝑡
, years of education, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑚𝑡, and race, 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑚.  To be specific,  the race dummy, 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑚, 
has value one for whites, and zero for non-whites.  The coefficient for race (e) is expected to be 
positive, because white women are more likely to get married than non-white women.  Age and 
age squared, as well as years of education are all continuous variables.  The coefficient of age (b) 
is expected to be positive, since women become more likely to get married when they get older.  
The coefficient of education (d) is expected to be negative.  Consistent with previous literature, 
higher educated women usually delay marriage or have lower marriage rates (Goldstein and 
Kenney 2001). 
        Since wage is another endogenous variable for propensity to get married, it is not directly 
controlled for.  Instead, years of education is usually used as a proxy for wage (Okun 2001; 
Goldstein and Kenney, 2001).  In this way, we can also keep all women including the non-
working women in the sample.  Although women’s own wage also affects their marital decision, 
as explained in the literature review the impact is mixed and the results found are usually small 
and insignificant (Santow and Bracher 1994; Oppenheimer 1994, 1997; Goldstein and Kenney 
2001).  Nevertheless, one may be still concerned that the instrument, skill-biased technological 
change, can affect female wage, which will violate the exogenous condition.  To further address 
this concern, in addition to the education control, I add occupation dummies in the robustness 
checks.   
        I control for the observable marriage market conditions, approximated by the sex ratio in a 
metropolitan area in a year.  The sex ratio is usually defined as the number of men over the 
number of women in a specific demographic group.  The age range I adopt to calculate the sex 
ratio is for men 21 to 40 and for women 21 to 35, as women usually prefer to marry men with 
same or greater age (Choo and Siow 2006).  An alternative choice is to use the sex ratio over 
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single men and women.  I use the sex ratio for corresponding racial and educational group for 
sub-samples of women in groups separated by education level and race, which I call “within-
group sex ratio”.  For instance, I regress the marriage propensity for high educated white women 
on the sex ratio among high educated white men aged 21 to 40 and high educated white women 
aged 21 to 35.  A higher sex ratio indicates that there are more prime age men than women.  
Hence, I expect the general sex ratio or the within-group sex ratio in a metropolitan area in a year 
has a positive effect on female marriage propensity.  
       Furthermore, I control for metropolitan area fixed effect, 𝑀𝐴𝑚, to account for the effect of 
unobserved metropolitan area conditions that are not changing over time.  Finally, I add 
metropolitan area specific time trends, 𝑇𝑚𝑡 , to control for the effect of unobserved factors 
changing over the linear time trend in each metropolitan area.   As a result, I only employ the 
variation of male wage gap in the same metropolitan area deviated from its linear time trend in 
each year to identify its causal impact on marriage propensity of women in that metropolitan area 
in each year.   
 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Baseline IV Estimation 
 
        Table 2.2 presents the baseline IV results of model (2.6) under nine specifications, where 
the male wage gap is instrumented by skill-biased technological change.  The coefficients of the 
instrument in first-stage regressions are positive and significant for all nine specifications.  A 
larger skill-biased technological shock significantly increases the wage gap between high and 
low educated men in a metropolitan area in a year.  The F statistics in the first-stage regression of 
the instrument is about 17.  Hence, the instrument is strong.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clusters defined by women’s age, metropolitan area and year due to the grouped structure of the 
error terms.   
        Column (1) shows the effect of the wage gap between high and low educated men on the 
marriage propensity for a woman aged 21 to 35.  I then separate samples into two subsamples by 
education.  A change in wage gap (the logarithm of the wage ratio) between high and low 
educated men does not have significant impact on women’s propensity to get married in general.  
Column (2) presents the result for low educated women, while column (3) presents that for high 
educated women.  After separating women by education, an increase in the wage gap between 
high and low educated men decreases a low educated woman’s propensity to get married, but 
increases a high educated women’s propensity to get married.  Further, I separate the female 
sample by race.  Column (4) shows that a change in wage gap (the logarithm of the wage ratio) 
between high and low educated men does not have significant effect on a white woman’s 
propensity to get married.  But after separating high and low educated white women, column (5) 
and (6) indicate that an increase in the male wage gap decreases a low educated white woman’s 
propensity to get married, but increases a high educated white woman’s propensity to get 
married.  Similarly, column (7), (8) and (9) indicate that an increase in the male wage gap does 
not have significant effect for a non-white woman when pooling low and high non-white women 
together, but have significant effects when separating the samples for low and high educated 
women.  It decreases a low educated non-white woman’s propensity to get married, but increases 
that for a high educated non-white woman. 
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Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted by age-metropolitan-year clusters. Control for metropolitan fixed effect with 212 metropolitan 
dummies and corresponding time trend in each metropolitan area.  Wages are composition-adjusted.  
    
 
Table 2.2 IV Result: Effect of the Wage Gap between High and Low Educated Men on Female Marriage Propensity 
Dependent variable: Marital status (=1 if ever married, =0 if never married) for a woman aged between 21-35 in 1990, 2000 and 2007 
 
             Woman (21-35)          White Woman (21-35)       Non-white Woman (21-35) 
 
 
(1) 
Pool 
sample 
(2) 
Low 
educated 
(3) 
High 
educated 
 
(4) 
White 
woman 
(5) 
Low 
educated 
(6) 
High 
educated 
 
(7) 
Non-
white 
(8) 
Low 
educated 
(9) 
High 
educated 
Log of wage ratio between high 
and low educated men 
-0.071 -0.423*** 0.237*  -0.084 -0.432*** 0.287**  0.077 -0.738*** 0.481*** 
[0.096] [0.117] [0.126]  [0.103] [0.138] [0.142]  [0.122] [0.170] [0.174] 
Age 0.164*** 0.150*** 0.169***  0.197*** 0.188*** 0.202***  0.056*** 0.044*** 0.061*** 
 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]  [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]  [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.000** 0 -0.000* 
 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Years of education -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.004***  -0.010*** -0.001 -0.012***  0.011*** -0.007*** 0.020*** 
 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Race dummy for white 0.167*** 0.240*** 0.109***         
 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]         
Within group sex ratio -0.012 0.050*** 0.100**  -0.004 0.037** 0.070*  0.080*** 0.031 0.119*** 
 
 [0.036] [0.015] [0.041]  [0.035] [0.015] [0.042]  [0.027] [0.021] [0.034] 
Constant -2.399*** -2.081*** -2.915***  -2.684*** -2.401*** -3.141***  -1.265*** -0.268 -1.764*** 
 
 [0.111] [0.109] [0.114]  [0.114] [0.123] [0.116]  [0.256] [0.321] [0.195] 
First stage: Coefficient of 
technological shock 
0.282*** 0.219*** 0.243***  0.290*** 0.215*** 0.232***  0.305*** 0.280*** 0.312*** 
[0.009] [0.010] [0.008]  [0.009] [0.010] [0.008]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
Observations 689,034 310,467 378,567  541,524 241,152 300,372  147,510 69,315 78,195 
R-squared 0.249 0.224 0.285  0.259 0.203 0.308  0.178 0.149 0.216 
Number of clusters 9,539 9,434 9,483  9,536 9,383 9,462  7,647 6,584 6,408 
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        The coefficient values of this main explanatory variable display how much the expected 
mean values of the marriage propensity for a woman (the expected mean probability for her to be 
ever married) will change when the logarithm value of the wage ratio between high and low 
educated men increases by 1.  To be more informative, the products of ln(101/100) (0.01) and 
the coefficient values are the value changes in the expected means of the probability to be ever 
married due to a 1% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men.   
        To be specific, based on the IV results using the sample of low educated women aged 
between 21 and 35, a 1% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men 
decreases a low educated woman’s probability to ever be married by about 0.423 (0.423*ln(1.01)) 
percentage point.  However, according to the results from the sample of high educated women 
aged between 21 and 35, a 1% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men 
causes a high educated woman’s probability to ever be married to increase by about 0.237 
(0.237*ln(1.01)) percentage point. 
        Similar effects are found for white and non-white women.  For high or low educated white 
women aged between 21 to 35, a 1% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated 
men causes about 0.432 (0.432*ln(1.01)) percentage point decrease in a low educated white 
woman’s probability to marry, but about 0.287 (0.287*ln(1.01)) percentage point increase in a 
high educated white woman’s probability to be ever married.  Finally, IV results indicate a 1% 
increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men decreases the probability of a low 
educated non-white woman to marry by 0.738 (0.738*ln(1.01)) percentage point and it increases 
the probability of a high educated non-white woman to marry by 0.481 (0.481*ln(1.01)) 
percentage point. 
        In fact, the wage ratio between high and low educated men increases, on average, 10% from 
1990 to 2007 according to Table 2.1.  I then obtain the change in the expected mean of a 
woman’s marriage propensity (probability to be ever married) due to a 10% increase in the wage 
ratio between high and low educated men by calculating the product of the coefficient values of 
the main explanatory variable and ln(1.1). 15   
        Results are shown in Table 2.3 row 1.  A 10% increase in the wage ratio between high and 
low educated men decreases the probability to be ever married by 4.03 percentage points for a 
low educated woman, and also decreases that by 4.12 and 7.03 percentage points for a low 
educated white woman or a low educated non-white woman respectively.  A 10% increase in the 
wage ratio between high and low educated men increases the probability to be ever married for a 
high educated woman by 2.26 percentage points, and also increases that by 2.74 and 4.58 
percentage points for a high educated white woman or a high educated non-white woman 
respectively. 
        The individual marriage propensity change can be observed by the marriage rate change for 
women aged between 21 and 35 at an aggregate level.  Refer to Figure 2.1, the marriage rate for 
low educated women declines about 18% from 73% in 1990 to 55% in 2007.  The 10% increase 
in the wage ratio between high and low educated men reduces a low educated woman’s 
propensity to get married by 4.03 percentage points.  At an aggregate level, this can reflect a 
decrease of 4.03 percentage points in the marriage rates among 21 to 35 years old low educated 
                                                          
    15For simplicity, let equation (2.6) be expressed as  𝑀𝑎𝑟1 = 𝑎𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠. When male wage 
ratio increases by 10% and others remain unchanged, there is 𝑀𝑎𝑟2 = 𝑎𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 1.1) + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑎𝑙𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑎 ∗ ln (1.1).  So, we can get 𝑀𝑎𝑟2 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟1 = 𝑎 ∗ ln (1.1).  Hence, when male 
wage ratio increases by 10%, the marriage propensity for a woman would increase by the amount of a*ln(1.1)*100 
percent, which is the coefficient for ln(male wage ratio) in the estimation of (2.6) times ln(1.1). 
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women.  Therefore, the effect of male wage gap on female marriage propensity explains about 
22% (4.03/18) of the marriage rates decline.  Marriage rate for high educated women however 
decreases by about 12% from 64% in 1990 to 52% in 2007.  The 10% increase in the male wage 
ratio between high and low educated men increases a high educated woman’s propensity to get 
married by 2.26 percentage points.  At an aggregate level, it can also lead to an increase of 2.26 
percentage points in the marriage rate among 21 to 35 years old low educated women.  Therefore, 
based on the actual decline of 12%, the reduction is about 19% (2.26/12).  If there is no such 
effect, the decline should have been 14.26%, which I call the “counterfactual decline”.  The 
effect reduces about 16% (2.26/14.26) of this counterfactual decline of marriage rates among 
high educated women.   
         
        Accordingly, one can calculate how much the marriage rate change among white or non-
white women can be explained by the effect of male wage gap on female marriage propensity.  
From 1990 to 2007, the marriage rates decline is about 18% for low educated white women and 
11% for high educated white women.  The effect of a 10% increase in the wage ratio between 
high and low educated men increases over the same time explains about 23% (4.12/18) of the 
marriage rate decline among low educated white women and reduces about 20% (2.74/13.74) of 
the counterfactual decline (11+2.74) among high educated white women.  For non-white women, 
the marriage rates decline is about 15% and 10% for low and high educated non-white women 
respectively.  Therefore, the 10% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men 
explains about 47% (7.03/15) of the marriage rate decline of low educated non-white women, 
and reduces about 31% (4.58/14.58) of the counterfactual marriage rate decline.  In general, the 
effects are more influential among non-white women. 
        The coefficients for the control variables are generally significant with expected signs.  
Marriage propensity is higher for an older woman, and higher for whites; it is also higher for a 
woman in the metropolitan area with higher sex ratio within her educational and racial group.  
Marriage propensity is lower, however, for a woman with more years of education. 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.3 Change in Expected Mean Female Marriage Propensity Due to A 10% Increase in the 
Wage Ratio between High and Low Educated Men  (Unit: Percentage Point) 
10% increase in wage ratio 
between high and low 
educated men 
 
Woman 
 (21-35)  
White Woman 
(21-35)  
Non-white Woman 
(21-35) 
 
Low 
educated 
High 
educated  
Low 
educated 
High 
educated  
Low 
educated 
High 
educated  
Composition-adjusted 
(Baseline)  -4.03*** 2.26*  -4.12*** 2.74**  -7.03*** 4.58*** 
Composition-adjusted race-
specific     -3.31* 3.92**  -8.23** 15.5** 
Efficiency-adjusted  -7.39*** 4.46*  -7.14*** 5.92*  -15.7*** 8.99*** 
Efficiency-adjusted  race-
specific     -7.42*** 5.15*  -36.95** - 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Value presented are the percentage points change of a woman’s marriage 
propensity due to a 10% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated men, calculated by corresponding 
estimation coefficients times ln(1.1). 
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2.6.2 Alternative Measures and Subsamples 
 
        I use the “race-specific male wage gap” as main explanatory variable to check the 
robustness of the baseline results, as women mostly marry men within the same racial group 
(Seitz, 2009).  Specifically, I use the logarithm of the wage ratio between high and low educated 
white men and the logarithm of the wage ratio between high and low educated non-white men 
respectively as the main explanatory variable for separate samples of white and non-white 
women.  I apply the same instrument as in the baseline estimation. 
        Table 2.4 presents the IV results.  The coefficients of the instrument in first-stage 
regressions are always positive and significant with F values bigger than 10.  Second stage 
results are generally consistent with the baseline results. The race-specific male wage gap 
significantly reduces the marriage propensity for low educated white women and non-white 
women, but significantly increases that for high educated white women and non-white women.  
Specifically, a 1% increase in the wage ratio between high and low educated white men 
decreases the expected mean marriage propensity for a low educated white woman by 0.347 
(0.347*ln(1.01)) percentage point and it increases that for a high educated white woman by 
0.411 (0.411*ln(1.01)) percentage point.  For or non-whites,  a 1% increase in the wage ratio 
between high and low educated non-white men decreases the expected average marriage 
propensity for a low educated non-white woman by 0.863 (0.863*ln(1.01)) percentage point and 
it increases that for a high educated non-white woman by 1.627 (1.627*ln(1.01)) percentage 
points.    
        As presented in Table 2.3 row 2, a 10% increase in the wage ratio between high and low 
educated white men decreases the average expected marriage propensity for a low educated 
white woman aged between 21 and 35 by 3.31 percentage points, but increases that for a high 
educated white woman aged between 21 and 35 by 3.92 percentage points.  A 10% increase in 
the wage ratio between high and low educated non-white men decreases a low educated non-
white woman’s average expected marriage propensity by 8.23 percentage points, but increases a 
high educated non-white woman’s average expected marriage propensity by 15.5 percentage 
points.   
        I also check the robustness of the baseline results with the alternative methods to adjust 
wage.  We first separate workers into different efficiency groups by race, gender, education and 
experience.  The relative wage ratio of each efficiency group compared with one base efficiency 
group is the relative efficiency factor.  Average wage of each group weighted by the relative 
efficiency factor is called efficiency-adjusted wage.  The average wage of each group weighted 
further by the compositional weight of labor inputs in each group in addition to the efficiency 
adjustment is called composition-adjusted wage. 16  Previous results are using composition-
adjusted wage.  Table 2.3 row 3 and 4 present results using efficiency-adjusted wage.  Results 
obtained by efficiency-adjusted wage have the same signs but bigger magnitudes compared with 
the results obtained by composition-adjusted wage, which is consistent for whites and non-
whites separately.   For example, 10% increase in the efficiency-adjusted wage ratio between 
high and low educated men decreases a low educated woman’s marriage propensity by 7.39 
percentage points, which explains about 41% (7.39/18) of the aggregate marriage rates decline 
among low educated women.   A 10% increase in the efficiency-adjusted wage ratio between 
high and low educated men, however, increases a high educated woman’s marriage propensity  
 
                                                          
    
16
 See Appendix A for details. 
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by 4.46 percentage points, which reduces about 27% (4.46/16.46) of the counterfactual decline 
of marriage rates if there is no such increase effect. 
        In Table 2.5, I show regression results using efficiency-adjusted wage for samples of all 
women and white women aged from 21 to 35.  Given the same specification, I further check the 
robustness using only black women.  Results for low educated black women are similar to that 
for low educated non-white women.  It becomes insignificant for high educated black women, 
probably because that there are few samples of high educated black women aged 21 to 35 in 
some metropolitan areas in some year.   
        Besides, I check results using alternative measures of the dependent and some control 
variables.  For instance, I delete separated, divorced and widowed women and restrict the sample 
to include only currently married and single women, but it does not change the basic conclusion.  
Using women aged 21 to 30 instead of 21 to 35 does not alter the major results, either.  Similarly, 
there are no major changes in the results by using sex ratio with the alternative age range of men 
and women or the sex ratio among single men and women. . 
Table 2.4 IV Result: Effect of the Race-Specific Wage Gap between High and Low Educated 
Men on Female Marriage Propensity 
Dependent variable: Marital status (=1 if ever married, =0 if never married) for woman aged 21-35 in 1990, 2000 
and 2007 
 
 White Woman (21-35)  Non-white Woman (21-35) 
 
 Low educated High educated  Low educated High educated 
Logarithm of  race-
specific wage ratio 
between high and low 
educated men 
 -0.347* 0.411**  -0.863** 1.627** 
 [0.190] [0.186]  [0.417] [0.808] 
Age  0.187*** 0.201***  0.046*** 0.064*** 
 
 [0.006] [0.007]  [0.010] [0.010] 
Age^2  -0.003*** -0.003***  0 -0.000** 
 
 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
Years of education  -0.001 -0.012***  -0.009*** 0.023*** 
 
 [0.001] [0.001]  [0.002] [0.002] 
Within group sex ratio  0.045** 0.053  0.289 -2.322** 
 
 [0.019] [0.048]  [0.216] [0.997] 
Constant  -2.441*** -3.152***  -0.803 2.009 
 
 [0.143] [0.117]  [0.549] [1.494] 
First stage:  0.212*** 0.225***  0.064*** 1.558*** 
Coefficient of 
technological shock  [0.010] [0.008]  [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations  236,052 296,461  44,217 51,682 
R-squared  0.204 0.308  0.147 0.213 
Number of clusters  9,296 9,373  4,310 4,233 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted by age-metropolitan-year clusters. Key 
explanatory variable is the logarithm of the wage ratio between high and low educated white men and the logarithm 
of wage ratio between high and low educated non-white men respectively when the dependent variable is for white 
or non-white women.  Control for metropolitan fixed effect with 210 metropolitan dummies and corresponding 
metropolitan time trends. Wages are composition-adjusted. 
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Table 2.5 IV Result: Effect of the Efficiency-Adjusted Wage Gap between High and Low Educated Men on White and Black 
Women’s Marriage Propensity 
Dependent variable: Married now (=1 if ever married, =0 if never married) for women aged 21-35 in 1990, 2000 and 2007 
 
                Woman (21-35)             White Woman (21-35)             Black Woman (21-35) 
 
Pool 
sample 
Low 
educated 
High 
educated 
White 
woman 
Low 
educated 
High 
educated 
Black 
woman 
Low 
educated 
High 
educated 
Logarithm of wage ratio between 
high and low educated men 
-0.410** -0.743*** 0.415 -0.183 -0.749*** 0.621* -0.797*** -1.586*** -0.526 
[0.209] [0.213] [0.256] [0.196] [0.229] [0.323] [0.250] [0.400] [0.359] 
Age 0.163*** 0.149*** 0.173*** 0.197*** 0.188*** 0.201*** 0.016** 0.017* 0.025** 
 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010] 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000** 0 0 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Years of education -0.008*** -0.001 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.012*** 0.008*** 0.004** 0.002 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Race dummy for white 0.252*** 0.307*** 0.205***       
 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]       
Within group sex ratio -0.005 0.062*** 0.073* 0.006 0.051*** 0.078* 0.053** 0.006 0.064** 
 
[0.034] [0.013] [0.038] [0.031] [0.013] [0.040] [0.025] [0.024] [0.027] 
Constant -2.513*** -2.411*** -2.788*** -2.754*** -2.680*** -2.963*** -0.585* -0.437 -0.346** 
 
[0.097] [0.096] [0.130] [0.103] [0.104] [0.134] [0.333] [0.395] [0.168] 
First stage: Coefficient of 
technological shock 
0.060*** 0.076*** 0.058*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
Observations 643,734 295,500 348,234 541,524 241,152 300,372 102,210 54,348 47,862 
R-squared 0.263 0.239 0.296 0.259 0.203 0.308 0.129 0.109 0.162 
Number of clusters 9,539 9,424 9,478 9,536 9,383 9,462 6,530 5,658 5,341 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted by age-metropolitan-year clusters. Control for metropolitan fixed effect with 212 metropolitan 
dummies and corresponding time trend in each metropolitan area.  Wages are efficiency-adjusted.   
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2.6.3 Additional Controls 
 
        In this part, I first add additional occupational control to further examine the causal 
relationship.  As a valid instrument, skill-biased technological change should not be correlated 
with other uncontrolled determinants of female marriage propensity.  Skill-biased technological 
change can affect female wage as well as the wage gap between high and low educated women, 
which are not directly controlled for in the estimation.  Previous literature shows that the impact 
of female wage on their marriage propensity is mixed or insignificant, and I already control for 
years of education.  Nevertheless, one might still argue that the wage gap between high and low 
educated women has similar impacts on their marriage propensity as that of male wage gap, 
since women would have expected household income closer to or further away from the median 
household income (“norm”) in a metropolitan area within a year as the female wage gap changes. 
In order to address this concern, I add an occupation dummy to the estimation in Table 2.6 to 
further control for each woman’s own wage.  If the results for male wage gap also reflect the 
effect of female wage gap, the coefficient should be insignificant and relatively smaller after 
adding additional wage control.  As shown in Table 2.6, the coefficients for male wage gap are 
still significant with the same signs as in Table 2.5 and have even larger magnitudes.  This 
indicates the effects found on female marriage propensity are not from the female wage 
inequality or the woman’s own wage but from the male wage inequality.   
        Previously, the effect of wage gap between high and low educated men on female marriage 
propensity is explained to be the result of both assortative mating and the women’s tendency to 
compare relative expected household income with the median household income in her 
metropolitan area.  Alternatively, the mechanism can be through the effect of male wage gap on 
crime in that metropolitan area in a year.  This is because a higher male wage gap may lead to a 
higher propensity to conduct crime among low educated men (Mocan and Unel 2011).  A higher 
crime propensity for low educated men can cause more incarceration among low educated men 
and also the deterioration of their socioeconomic conditions, such as physical and mental health, 
social and economic stability and neighborhood conditions.  Those factors can decrease low 
educated women’s propensity to marry. 
        Table 2.7 presents the IV results after further controlling for the number of prisoners in a 
state within a year, the data for which are available on the website of U.S. Department of Justice.  
The signs of the coefficients for main explanatory variable are still consistent.  But the 
magnitudes are generally smaller compared with previous results and some are not significant.  
So it is possible that part of the effects of male wage gap on female marriage propensity reflects 
the effect of crime on marriage formation.   
 
2.7 Conclusion  
        This paper enriches literature in investigating the effect of male wage inequality on female 
marriage propensity.  The endogeneity and reverse causality problems of wage inequality are 
addressed by using an instrument, the skill-biased technological change, for male wage 
inequality.  To apply the instrument, the wage gap between high and low educated men is used 
as the measure for male wage inequality.  To be specific, this paper identifies the causal impact 
of the wage gap between high and low educated men on female marriage propensity.   
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Table 2.6 IV Result: Effect of the Wage Gap between High and Low Educated Men on White and Black Women’s Marriage 
Propensity Controlling for Occupation 
Dependent variable: Married now (=1 if ever married, =0 if never married) for women aged 21-35 in 1990, 2000 and 2007 
 
                 Woman (21-35)              White Woman (21-35)             Black Woman (21-35) 
 
Pool 
sample 
Low 
educated 
High 
educated 
White  
woman 
Low 
educated 
High 
educated 
Black 
woman  
Low 
educated 
High 
educated 
Logarithm of wage ratio between 
high and low educated men 
-0.394* -1.641*** 1.173*** -0.173 -1.538*** 1.507*** -0.750*** -1.508*** 0.023 
[0.206] [0.204] [0.293] [0.194] [0.228] [0.330] [0.249] [0.304] [0.347] 
Age 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.175*** 0.195*** 0.186*** 0.204*** 0.015** 0.016* 0.025** [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010] 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000** 0 0 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Years of education -0.007*** 0.001 -0.012*** -0.008*** 0.002** -0.014*** 0.005*** 0.002 -0.002 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Race dummy for white 0.250*** 0.306*** 0.204***       [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]       
Within group sex ratio -0.001 0.02 0.131*** 0.012 0.054** 0.109*** 0.053** -0.014 0.027 [0.034] [0.022] [0.048] [0.031] [0.023] [0.042] [0.025] [0.015] [0.027] 
Managerial and professional -0.078*** -0.062*** -0.104*** -0.099*** -0.087*** -0.112*** 0.034*** 0.052*** -0.026* [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.012] [0.014] 
Technical, sales, and 
administrative 
-0.090*** -0.074*** -0.127*** -0.109*** -0.098*** -0.134*** 0.009 0.032*** -0.054*** 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.013] 
Service -0.117*** -0.097*** -0.154*** -0.130*** -0.115*** -0.158*** -0.020*** -0.003 -0.069*** [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.015] 
Farming, forestry, and fishing -0.097*** -0.047*** -0.195*** -0.116*** -0.060*** -0.206*** -0.004 -0.013 0.017 [0.011] [0.014] [0.018] [0.011] [0.014] [0.018] [0.045] [0.046] [0.104] 
Precision production, craft, and 
repairers 
-0.103*** -0.078*** -0.148*** -0.125*** -0.109*** -0.153*** 0.024 0.074*** -0.066** 
[0.008] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.019] [0.025] [0.030] 
Operatives and laborers -0.104*** -0.088*** -0.155*** -0.121*** -0.112*** -0.156*** -0.003 0.027** -0.072*** [0.005] [0.006] [0.010] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.021] 
Observations 643,734 295,500 348,234 541,524 241,152 300,372 102,210 54,348 47,862 
R-squared 0.267 0.241 0.3 0.265 0.208 0.311 0.13 0.112 0.164 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.   Standard errors are adjusted by age-metropolitan-year clusters. The left out category of occupation dummies is the “non-
occupational responses”, mostly including women without work. First-stage results are significant with F values bigger than 10.  Wages are efficiency-adjusted. 
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Table 2.7 IV Result: Effect of the Wage Gap between High and Low Educated Men on Female Marriage Propensity Controlling for 
Number of Prisoners in State  
Dependent variable: Married now (=1 if ever married, =0 if never married) for women aged 21-35 in 1990, 2000 and 2007 
 
              Woman 21-35        White Woman 21-35            Non-white Woman 21-35 
  
Low educated High educated 
 
Low educated High educated 
 
Low educated High educated 
Baseline: Main explanatory variable is log of composition-adjusted wage ratio between high and low educated men. 
Logarithm of wage ratio between  -0.211* 0.172  -0.242* 0.233*  -0.456** 0.201 
high and low educated men  [0.120] [0.127]  [0.138] [0.140]  [0.191] [0.201] 
Number of prisoners  0.007*** -0.007***  0.005*** -0.005**  0.011*** -0.014*** 
(by state-year)  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.004] [0.005] 
Main explanatory variable is log of efficiency-adjusted wage ratio between high and low educated men. 
Logarithm of wage ratio between  -0.381* 0.322  -0.416* 0.486  -0.970** 0.368 
high and low educated men  [0.203] [0.253]  [0.221] [0.316]  [0.414] [0.371] 
Number of prisoners  0.007*** -0.007***  0.005*** -0.005**  0.012*** -0.014*** 
(by state-year)  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.004] [0.004] 
Main explanatory variable is log of efficiency-adjusted wage ratio between high and low educated men.  Non-white women sample only includes black women. 
Logarithm of wage ratio between  -0.408* 0.366     -1.128*** -0.345 
high and low educated men  [0.208] [0.253]     [0.434] [0.383] 
Number of prisoners  0.006*** -0.003*     0.008** 0.004 
(by state-year)  [0.002] [0.002]     [0.004] [0.004] 
Main explanatory variable is log of composition-adjusted race-specific male wage ratio. 
Logarithm of race-specific wage ratio      -0.174 0.338*  -0.534** -0.105 
between high and low educated men     [0.198] [0.181]  [0.211] [0.225] 
Number of prisoners     0.005*** -0.004**  0.011*** -0.015*** 
(by state-year)     [0.002] [0.002]  [0.004] [0.005] 
Main explanatory variable is efficiency-adjusted race-specific male wage ratio. 
Logarithm of race-specific wage ratio      -0.426* 0.496  -0.907** 0.355 
between high and low educated men     [0.226] [0.321]  [0.385] [0.362] 
Number of prisoners     0.005*** -0.005**  0.012*** -0.014*** 
(by state-year)     [0.002] [0.002]  [0.004] [0.004] 
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Standard errors are adjusted by age-metropolitan-year clusters.  First stage results are all significant with F values bigger 
than 10.  Data for number of prisoners in each state each year are from the website of U.S. Department of Justice.  Only the coefficients of IV results for male 
wage gap and the additional crime control are shown. 
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        The instrumental variable method is applied to a standard model in testing relationship 
between male wage inequality and female marriage propensity.  The model controls for women’s 
personal characteristics such as age and education as well as the marriage market condition 
approximated by the sex ratio.  It also accounts for the metropolitan area fixed effects and the 
metropolitan area specific time trends. 
        This paper finds that an increase in the wage gap between high and low educated men in a 
metropolitan area in a year results in lower marriage propensity for low educated women but a 
higher marriage propensity for high educated women aged from 21 to 35.  The reduction in 
marriage propensity for a low educated woman is usually higher than the increase in marriage 
propensity for a high educated woman, in response to the same change in the male wage gap.  
Basically, a 10% increase in wage gap between high and low educated men decreases marriage 
propensity for a low educated woman by at least 4 percentage points and increases that for a high 
educated woman by at least 2 percentage points. 
        Similar results also persist among white or non-white women separately.  For white women, 
the magnitude is closer to the general results, though for non-white women or only black women, 
the magnitude is greater than that for white women.  Hence, the effect of the male wage gap on 
the propensity to marry seems to be more influential among non-white women.  
        The results are robust to alternative sample specifications and variable measurements.  For 
instance, the effect of the race-specific male wage gap on the propensity to marry among whites 
or non-whites respectively are similar to the effect of the general male wage gap.  Results using 
efficiency-adjusted wage lead to the same signs but larger magnitudes compared with the results 
using composition-adjusted wage. 
        The impacts are also economically significant.  At the aggregate level, the change in 
marriage propensity transfers to the change in the marriage rates among high or low educated 
women aged from 21 to 35.  These findings help explain the relative slower decline of high 
educated women’s marriage rates and the relative faster decline of low educated women’s 
marriage rates compared with the general marriage decline trends.  For instance, the baseline 
results explain more than 22% of the overall marriage rates decline among low educated women.  
Meanwhile, it reduces more than 16% of the counterfactual decline of the marriage rates among 
high educated women.  With efficiency-adjusted method, the figure can go up to 41% for low 
educated women and 27% for high educated women. 
        The causal effect of male wage gap on female marriage propensity is channeled by both the 
comparison of expected household income with the median household income in the 
metropolitan area and the phenomenon of educational assortative mating.  They are not due to 
the change in female wage or wage gap between high and low educated women.  However, the 
impact of the wage gap between high and low educated men on female marriage propensity may 
channel through the impacts of male wage gap on crime.   
        The paper also has important practical implications.  It presents another social condition that 
can be changed by a higher wage inequality.  Rising wage inequality among men, potentially 
driven by the skill-biased technological change in recent decades, has not only led to social 
changes such as a higher crime propensity among the poor, but also affects the female marriage 
propensity differently among high and low educated women.  It demonstrates how inequality in 
economic conditions causes an inequality in the marriage formation.  Accordingly, as male wage 
inequality continue to increase, marriage is becoming a privilege for richer and higher educated 
people, and an impossible dream for poorer and less educated people.  The marriage decline 
raises many social concerns, as there are plenty of social problems as a result of marriage decline, 
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especially among the poor, such as out-of-wedlock childbearing, lower health and happiness 
outcomes, and reduced social supports.  This paper provides new perspectives in understanding 
and solving these problems.  For instance, reducing the wage gap between high and low educated 
men, probably by improving the skills for low educated men or improving the education 
especially for men can be helpful in solving the marital decline among low educated women.    
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CHAPTER 3. MALE INCOME INEQUALITY AND FEMALE MARITAL DECISIONS 
IN CHINA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
        Since the launch of the economic reform in 1978, China has experienced an impressive 
improvement in the standard of living.  Nevertheless, it has also witnessed a large increase in 
income inequality.  The magnitude of this increase, exceeding all comparable records in other 
countries, is highly concerning (Yang 1998).  The influences of rising income inequality on 
public health and education, crime and social stability, and long-term macroeconomic 
development are widely discussed and emphasized in previous research (Thorbecke and 
Charumilind 2002).  Researchers obtained similar results from China as they did from other 
countries.  For example, rising income inequality can lead to a lower happiness level, more 
tobacco, alcohol and drug consumption, higher mortality, lower sector growth as well as less 
macroeconomic stability in China (Zhao 2006; Li and Zhu 2006; Smyth and Qian 2008; Qin et al. 
2009).  However, the influence of income inequality on family formation in China seems to have 
been neglected. 
        In this paper, I focus on the relationship between income inequality and family formation in 
China.  More specifically, I study the effect of male income inequality on young women’s 
propensity to marry.  I use this study to provide new evidence on the influences of rising income 
inequality in China.  
        The determinants of marriage formation have been widely discussed in the literature, such 
as women’s economic independence, difficulty in transitioning to marriage, and the cost and 
benefit of the marital search process.  Male earning inequality affects marriage formation in 
marital search theory.  Rising wage inequality reflects the dispersion in the wage distribution of 
potential husbands, on which females are searching for males.  The empirical evidence of the 
relationship between economic inequality and family formation has just been identified in recent 
years.  Wage inequality is found to be a potential determinant of marriage trends in U.S 
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2007; Loughran 2002; Gould and Paserman 2003; Coughlin and 
Drewianka 2011).  Rising male wage inequality is responsible for almost 1/5 of the decline in the 
marriage rate among 20 to 30 years old women from 1970 to 1990 in the U.S. (Loughran 2002; 
Gould and Paserman 2003).   
        Although the negative effect of male wage inequality on the marriage rate is convincing 
using U.S. data, no similar evidence has been found in other countries.  As the socioeconomic 
backgrounds in other countries change, the results change.  For instance, marriage is of more 
importance in Asian countries traditionally, as well as in many developing countries without an 
adequate social security system.  Kuo (2008) investigates this link using data from Taiwan, but 
finds no significant effect of male wage inequality on female marriage propensity.  This paper 
explores the evidence from China, an example of an Asian developing country, to add to the 
related studies.  
        Unlike previous literature, my research finds that rising male income inequality increases 20 
to 34 years old Chinese women’s propensity to marry.  In each given year, the probability of 
women ever being married is higher in the city or county containing higher male income 
inequality.  And within each city or county, the probability of women ever being married is 
higher in the year with higher male income inequality.  The results are not caused by any 
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observable individual characteristic of the woman, such as her age, education or income.  They 
are not driven by the observed city or county characteristics such as sex ratio, average income 
level or the income gap between men and women.  My results are obtained from five 
specifications, which I control for different levels of fixed effects and time trends.  For example, 
in the most restrictive specification, I control for the year fixed effect and city/county fixed effect, 
as well as the national year trend.  Almost all estimation results indicate a significant positive 
effect of male income inequality on female marriage propensity.   
        The results are robust with different variable measurements and subsamples.  They appear 
to be stronger in certain subsamples than in the others.  For example, the positive effects of rising 
inequality on marriage are significant for both urban and rural women, but it becomes more 
pronounced for rural women.  It is no longer significant for subsamples of urban women under 
age 28 or urban women with at least a high school diploma. 
        The magnitude of these effects is not trivial.  In the urban cities, a 10% increase of income 
inequality from the mean increases the 20 to 34 women’s propensity to marry by at least 1.4 
percentage points.  The average propensity in samples is about 60 percentage points.  The effect 
in rural counties is even bigger.  A 10% increase of income inequality from the mean leads to a 
3.5% higher propensity to marry for rural women aged 20 to 34, the sample average of which is 
about 63 percentage points.  According to Yang (1998), the annual change of the overall Gini 
coefficient in China has been about 2.3% over 1981 to 1995.  It can be assumed that a similar 
change happens in a typical city or county.  For every 1000 women under age 34, 3 more urban 
women and 8 more rural women will get married in response to the higher income inequality 
each year.  Taking into account the large population and the continual increase of income 
inequality in China, the effect cannot be neglected.    
        I provide two possible explanations to the results.  The first one comes from a “marital 
search theory”.  Consider one dimension of marital search, when a woman searches for a 
husband according to the wage of men, conditional on other characteristics of the potential 
husband.  On one hand, as the distribution of male wage becomes more dispersive and possibly 
fatter tailed especially on the upper side, women delay marriage because they form a higher 
standard on the minimum level of acceptable wage from their potential husband, which is called 
the “reservation wage”.  On the other hand, it is possible that a fatter tail on the upper side 
promotes marriage because it increases the possibility for a woman to meet someone above a 
given value of “reservation wage”.  Theoretically, when the male wage distribution has little 
mass in the center compared to that in the tails, the promotion effect is going to dominate.  
Otherwise, the delay effect is going to dominate.  Empirical results suggest the delay effect is the 
dominant effect in the U.S.   However, the promotion effect can be the dominant effect in China 
with polarization in the income distribution.   
        Another possible explanation comes from the belief that higher income inequality can lead 
to higher income risk and financial uncertainty.  Since the family has risk sharing and social 
security functions, it becomes more desirable when income inequality increases.  In line with this 
mechanism, I find that not only male income inequality increases female marriage propensity, 
the income inequality among all people also affects both men’s and women’s marriage 
propensity. 
        The results obtained in this paper have important implications.  In general, they show that 
income inequality can raise the demand for families.  However, the realities of marriage are not 
optimistic and are driven by many other factors.  For instance, many men stay single especially 
those in poor rural areas, because of the high sex ratio of men over women and the out-marriage 
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of single women, meaning rural women migrate to other villages to get married (Dus Gupta, 
Ebenstein, and Sharygin 2011).  Meanwhile, the divorce rate in China has been rising 
continually.17  In other words, marriage is more desirable under high income inequality and 
inadequate social security, but it is harder to form and easier to dissolve due to other factors.  
Hence, policies to reduce income inequality, to improve social security systems and to promote 
and strengthen marriage are necessary in China. 
        The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows: In section 3.2, I discuss the theories about 
marriage formation and the theories to link income inequality and marital decision.  In section 3, 
I provide the Chinese background and studies of marriage formation.  In section 3.4, I introduce 
the CHNS data and the estimation model.  In section 3.5, I present the estimation results and the 
robustness checks as well as the discussion of different mechanisms.  In section 3.6, I provide a 
conclusion based on the previous sections of this Chapter. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Determinants of Marital Decisions 
 
        The determinants of whether and when women decide to marry have long been studied.  
Becker (1973) first analyzed marriage from an economic perspective.  He viewed marriage as a 
utility maximization choice determined by personal preferences and marriage market conditions.  
Marital gains come from the household specification between husbands and wives (Becker 1981).   
        Accordingly, many researchers look at the effect of women’s economic independence 
featured by higher education, more labor force participation and higher wage on their propensity 
and timing to marry.  Some argue that women’s economic independence reduces their marital 
gains and increases the cost of household production and childbearing, hence causing marriage 
delay or decline (Oppenheimer 1988; Okun 2001).  Others argue that women’s higher earnings 
may promote marriage since marital gains also include risk sharing and consumption 
complementarities (Hess 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).  It is still controversial whether 
women’s economic independence can cause marital delay or decline (Santow and Bracher 1994; 
Oppenheimer 1994, 1997; Goldstein and Kenney 2001).  However, researchers have reached a 
consensus that more labor force participation and higher earnings of men can raise the net benefit 
from marriage for both husbands and wives, hence promoting marriage (Pamela and Manning 
1997; Xie et al. 2003).   
        Along with the discussion about marital gains, there is also some work focusing on the 
difficulties in the transition to marriage.  There can be difficulties ranging from financial 
obstacles to school enrollment or military service (Oppenheimer 2003).  Longer school 
enrollments are found to delay the marriage of young women (Goldstein and Kenney 2001).  
Due to these transition difficulties, cohabitation becomes a popular choice, which is facilitated 
by the sexual revolution and birth control development (Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz 1996; Goldin 
and Katz 2002).    
        Recent studies usually view marriage formation as a marital search process (Keeley 1977).  
From the women’s perspective, they search over men with different personal characteristics.  
They make marital decisions based on their expected net benefit during each search period.  The 
                                                          
    
17 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, Table 23.24 Number of marriages and divorces,  
http://www.allcountries.org/china_statistics/23_44_number_of_marriages_and_divorces.html (2005)   
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net benefit is jointly determined by personal life-cycle preferences and marital market structures.  
According to Becker (1974), when the value of any expected improvement in the mate is no 
greater than the time and other inputs into the additional search, the search process will end.  Let 
us call the “minimum level of utility that is acceptable to the woman or her family in a match” 
the “reservation level” (Montgomery, Cheung , and  Donna 1988).  Marriage occurs when the 
offer is available and the value to marry exceeds the “reservation level”.  Under this framework, 
factors that increase the offer rates and lower the reservation level can increase the possiblity of 
marriage at a given time.  For example, higher sex ratio between men and women provides 
higher offer rates in the marriage market to women, hence increases the marriage rate of women 
(Schoen 1983; Angrist 2002).   
 
3.2.2 Male Wage Inequality and Female Marital Search 
 
        Marital search theory provides a mechanism to explain the effect of male income inequality 
on female propensity to marry in China.  Loughran (2002) links male wage inequality to female 
age at first marriage under the female marital search model, based on the job search model in 
Mortensen (1986).  He assumes women search over male wages, denoted as  𝑤, conditional on 
the other observable characteristics of men, such as age, race, religion, appearance and education, 
denoted as  𝐻.  At each period  𝑡, a woman gets at most one randomly drawn wage offer from a 
potential husband with probability 𝑞 from the conditional wage distribution, denoted as 𝐹(𝑤|𝐻).  
Let 𝑞 be solely determined by the exogenous factors of the marriage market, such as the sex ratio.  
Let  W(𝑤𝑡) be the present value of accepting the offer and 𝑈𝑡𝑠 be her utility of being single in 
period t.  Let 𝑐𝑡 be her cost to pursue the offer in period t regardless of whether she gets the offer.    
        In this search problem, there exists a wage offer 𝑤∗, named the “reservation wage”,  such 
that the woman is indifferent from receiving the current offer and proceeding with an additional 
search in the next period.  Let  𝛽 be the discount factor.  As shown in equation (3.1), at the 
reservation wage level, the net benefit of being married equals the discounted net benefit of 
searching in the future.  In this period, the woman stops searching and accepts the current offer, 
and then gets married.  Loughran (2002) further specifies the probability of getting married in 
equation (3.2), which is the product of the probability of getting an offer 𝑞 and the probability of 
accepting the given offer [1 − 𝐹(𝑤∗)].  
 
(3.1) 𝑊(𝑤∗) − 𝑈𝑠 = 𝛽𝑞 ∫ [𝑊(𝑤) − 𝑊(𝑤∗)]𝑑𝐹(𝑤|𝐻)?̅?
𝑤∗
− 𝑐 
 
(3.2)  𝑝 = 𝑞[1 − 𝐹(𝑤∗)] 
 
        Two competing effects can occur as the male wage inequality enlarges in the search model.  
Assume the wage distribution can be fully depicted by its mean 𝜇 and standard deviation  𝜎.  
Basically, keeping the mean constant, the increases of wage inequality, a higher 𝜎, reflects the 
spread out of male wage distribution.  It increases the reservation wage 𝑤∗, thus lowering the 
possibility to accept a given offer [1 − 𝐹(𝑤∗)].  We shall call this the “marital delay effect”.     
Meanwhile, the spread of wage distribution also increases the possibility to meet someone above 
the reservation wage [1 − 𝐹(𝑤∗)], which is the possibility to accept the offer at any given value 
of  𝑤∗.  We shall call this the “marital promotion effect”. 
        The key to determining which effect on [1 − 𝐹(𝑤∗)]  dominates is the shape of the 
distribution.  As mentioned in Gould and Paserman (2002), when the distribution has more mass 
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in the center than the tails, the delay effect dominates.  For example, in Figure 3.1, as 𝜎 enlarges, 
wage distribution changes from 𝐹1(𝑤|𝐻) to 𝐹2(𝑤|𝐻).  The reservation wage increases from 𝑤1∗ 
to 𝑤2
∗
. The area above 𝑤1∗  in distribution 𝐹1(𝑤|𝐻)  is bigger than the area above 𝑤2∗  in 
distribution  𝐹2(𝑤|𝐻).  On the contrary, when the distribution has more mass in the tails than in 
the center, the promotion effect dominates (Burdett and Ondrich 1985).  For example, in Figure 
3.1, as 𝜎 enlarges, the wage distribution changes from 𝐹2(𝑤|𝐻) to 𝐹3(𝑤|𝐻).  The reservation 
wage increases from 𝑤2∗ to 𝑤3∗, 𝐹3(𝑤|𝐻) has more mass in the tails than in the center and the 
area above 𝑤2∗ in distribution 𝐹2(𝑤|𝐻) is smaller than the area above 𝑤3∗ in distribution 𝐹3(𝑤|𝐻). 
 
Figure 3.1 The Probability of Accepting A Marriage Offer Under Different Male Wage 
Distributions 
 
3.2.3 Marry to Be More Secure 
       
        Another mechanism could be that the income risk and social uncertainty caused by higher 
income inequality will raise the demand for marriage with social security functions.  People get 
mutual supports, elderly care, and income risk-sharing over the lifetime from family members.  
Becker (1974) argues that the creation of one’s own children is the fundamental reason for 
marriage.  Elder care heavily relies on spouses and children in developing countries like China.  
The desire to share income risk promotes marriage (Hess 2004).  When income shocks are 
stronger and more frequent and social uncertainty is higher, it becomes more appealing to form 
families, especially in countries that lack adequate social security systems.   
        The changes in male income inequality may just reflect changes in overall income 
inequality.  Overall income inequality raises the financial risk and uncertainty of the society 
(Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994).   For example, changing income distribution is associated with 
higher income mobility.  Income inequality is also associated with social instability, such as 
higher crime rates (Choe 2008).  In general, higher income inequality leads to higher risk and 
uncertainty economically and socially, which leads to a higher demand for marriage.  The effects 
may vary with different causes of income risk.  Firstly, it is possible that income mobility is 
mainly within groups defined by education, experience or age (Geweke and Keane 2000; 
Schmidt 2008).  In this case, it is generally more beneficial for poor people, both men and 
women, to get married with richer partners.  Specifically, people with different risk tolerance 
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could also behave differently. For instance, risk neutral or adverse women/men usually want to 
marry up with rich men/women in order to obtain a better financial condition (Hess 2004; 
Coughlin and Drewianka 2011).  However, high risk tolerant women/men may tend to delay 
marriage in pursuit of their own financial stability and to make a proper choice of their future 
husband/wife (Oppenheimer, Kalmij, and Wackero 1997; Schmidt 2008).  Secondly, it is 
possible that higher income mobility comes from between-group inequality, because that the 
same individual’s income may rank differently in the income distribution over time (Gottschalk 
1997; Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Moffitt and Gottschalk 2011).  As a result, both young men 
and women want to share income risk over lifetime with their spouses.  With the exception that 
younger women may wait longer for a more credible signal from men and marry later, since 
younger men tend to have higher earning mobility than older men (Buchinsky and Hunt 1999).  
        In conclusion, competing effects exist when income inequality affects marriage formation.  
The effects vary for people with different demographic features.  It is not clear to determine, 
however, the overall impact of income inequality on marriage formation only by checking the 
theories. 
 
3.3 Background 
3.3.1 Policies 
 
        Individuals’ marital timing has been affected by policies in modern China.  In the early 70s, 
population policy encouraged young people to delay marriage (Ye 1992).  In 1980, the New 
Marriage Law sets the “minimum age to marry” to be 22 years for men and 20 years for women 
(Xia and Zhou 2003).  Han (2010) explains the median age at first marriage between 1970 and 
2000 in China by policies.  Accordingly, the initial drop of age at first marriage in the 70s and 
early 80s was a reflection of the “late marriage” policy; the steady increase from the mid-1980s 
to 2000 was due to the lower legal marriage age and the New Marriage Law in 1980.  The delay 
trend of marriage from 1985 to 2000 was also the result of education reform.      
        The choices of partners have also been affected by polices.  Since 1950, arranged marriage 
has been deemed illegal by the Marriage Law.  From 1966 to 1978, the “Cultural Revolution” 
encouraged young adults to marry people outside their own educational groups especially to 
marry those in the working class, such as workers, farmers and soldiers.  Since the end of the 
“Cultural Revolution” in 1978, the choice to select partners became freer (Xia and Zhou, 2003).  
Accordingly, the education homogamy rates, i.e. the rates of people marrying with similar 
education levels,  experienced a decrease from 1970 to 1980, a substantial increase from 1980 to 
1995 and a slower growth in late 1990s (Han 2010).   
        Concurrently, the marriage market has been influenced by policies.  Since 1978, the “reform 
and opening-up” policy has resulted in a major improvement in economical and educational 
outcomes.  Women’s social standing has been stepped up and their educational attainment has 
caught up with men’s (Mu and Xie 2011).   The “one-child policy” 18, starting in 1978, has 
resulted in an unbalanced sex ratio in China, mainly due to the preference of sons, especially in 
rural areas (Zhu, Lu, and Hesketh 2009).  During the reforms for state-owned enterprises in the 
mid-1990s, a massive number of workers were laid off, and urban labor force participation was 
                                                          
    
18
 According to “one child policy”, urban couples can have one child without fines.  Rural couples, couples with 
at least one ethnic minority and couples both with no siblings can have a second child without fines.   
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reduced by almost 10%.  Also noteworthy is that more females were laid off at all working ages 
than males (Maurer-Fazio, Hughes, and Zhang 2005). 
 
3.3.2 Income Inequality, Polarization, and Mobility 
 
        Along with economic reform, income inequality has also been increased.  From 1978 to 
2006, the overall Gini coefficient had increased from 0.31 to 0.45; the rural Gini coefficient 
changed from 0.21 to 0.37 and the urban Gini coefficient changed from 0.16 to 0.34 (Yao and 
Wu 2010).  The wage gap between males and females has increased; the urban/rural economic 
gap has widened; and the regional inequality between eastern provinces and the interior and 
western provinces has grown (Maurer-Fazio et al. 2005).  Income inequality has increased both 
within and between rural counties between 1988 to 1995 (Gustafsson and Li 2002). 
        Polarization has been rising together with income inequality exaggeration in China (Chen 
and Zhang 2009).  Kanbur and Zhang (2001) varified that the overall trends of income inequality 
and polarization were rising from 1983 to 1995, by using three newly developed measures of 
polarization and two traditional measures of income inequality.  Meanwhile, income mobility has 
become higher for the poorest 25% of the people, but lower for the middle class people, using 
rural data from 1987 to 2002 (Zhang, Huang and Mi 2006).   
 
3.3.3 Marital Propensity and Timing 
 
        Studies on marriage formation in China are limited; among which no papers have linked 
income inequality to marriage formation.  Existing papers find some similar features as in 
western countries.  For instance, urban people usually marry later than rural people and men 
usually marry later than women (Li 1985; Ru, Lu, and Li 2007).  Better education and higher 
regional GDP growth rate reduces the tendency for young adults to get married.  Urban (but not 
rural) men and women with higher wages tend to delay marriage (Xu, Qiang, and Wang 2003).   
        Researchers have paid attention to the problems due to the unbalanced sex ratio in China.  
The significant unbalanced sex ratio is mainly caused by sex selective abortion under the “one 
child policy”.  It is worse in poor rural areas due to women’s “out-marriage”, when they migrate 
out of the village to get married (Meng 2009).  As predicted by Dus Gupta, et. al (2011), “one in 
five men will fail to marry in 2020” without the proper policy and this will mostly happen to men 
in the rural areas of poor provinces.   
 
3.4 Data and Model     
3.4.1 Data 
 
        The micro data used in this paper is from the China Health and Nutrition Surveys (CHNS).  
It is conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina and the 
National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention.  The survey started in 1989 and repeated in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 
2009.  Each year it drew samples from about 4400 households that contained around 19,000 
individuals.  They were located in nine provinces, namely the Jiangsu, Shandong, Heilongjiang, 
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Liaoning, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and the Guizho. 19   These provinces varied 
substantially in geography, economic development, public resources, and general health 
indicators.  Table 3.1 denotes the region and GDP per capita in 2007 of each province.   
        A multistage, random cluster process was used in each province.  Two urban cities in each 
province were surveyed, which included the provincial capital and another large city.  Four rural 
counties20 in each province were randomly selected by a weighted sampling scheme.  Urban and 
suburban neighborhoods within the cities and villages and townships within the counties were 
randomly selected.21  
        Three datasets were merged, which respectively contained demographic, education, and 
income features, into one unbalanced panel.  The merged dataset has a total of 103,764 
observations, among which 51,775 are men.  Each observation is uniquely identified by a 
household ID, a household member ID, and the survey year.  In total, 27,783 individuals had 
participated in the survey at least once.  Only 2,952 among them had participated in all eight 
waves of surveys.22   
 
Table 3.1 Provinces in CHNS Survey, Region and GDP Per Capita 
Notes: GDP per capita (Yuan). Reprinted from World statistics yearbook in 2007 (p.30-32), by Wang et al, 2007, 
Beijing: China Financial and Economic Publishing House   
 
3.4.2 Framework 
 
        According to previous literature, the decision to marry in a certain year for a woman is 
related to factors that indicate her economic independence and the difficulties in transitioning to 
                                                          
19 Heilongjiang was not surveyed in 1989, 1991 and 1993.  Liaoning was not surveyed in 1997.  Other provinces  
were surveyed all eight years.   
    
20
 Counties are geographic units within rural areas in each province. 
21
 The survey does not provide representative weight value for each individual. To control for multistage sampling 
and an array of multilevel modeling issues, it is recommended to adjust standard errors by clustering at the  
community level if possible, according to the project senior programmer.   
    
22
 5,765 individuals had participated only once, 4,183 twice, 4,736 three times, 3,497 four times, 3,544 five times,  
1,381 six times, and 1,725 seven times. 
Provinces Region 2007 GDP Per Capita 
(Yuan) Jiangsu East 32,985 
Shandong East 27,148 
Liaoning Northeast 24,645 
Heilongjiang Northeast 18,463 
Henan South Central 15,056 
Hubei South Central 14,733 
Hunan South Central 13,123 
Guangxi South Central 11,417 
Guizhou Southwest 6,742 
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marriage.  These can be captured by the woman’s personal attributes such as age, wage and 
education levels.  Again, according to search theory, the marriage market features also affect a 
woman’s marriage decision-making.  Sex ratio affects the offer rates 𝑞 as in equation (3.2).  The 
mean income level and gender wage gap affects the income distribution  𝐹 as in equation (3.2).   
And the key factor I am interested in is the income inequality of males, which affects the 
possibility to accept a marriage offer, the value of [1 − 𝐹(𝑤∗)]  as in equation (3.2).  The 
marriage decision is also shaped by unobserved changes in the marriage market, such as related 
policies and socioeconomic trends.   
       To summarize, the decision to marry for woman (i) in city/county (j) in year (t) is a function 
of male income inequality, 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑗𝑡 , her personal attributes, 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 , and other observed, 𝑀𝑗𝑡, and 
unobserved, 𝑈𝑗𝑡, marriage market conditions, as noted in equation (3.3).  Altogether, the reduced 
form model is stated in equation (3.4).   
  
(3.3) 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑗𝑡, 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑀𝑗𝑡 , 𝑈𝑗𝑡)  
 
3.4.3 Baseline Specification 
 
(3.4) 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏′ ∗ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + c′ ∗ 𝑀𝑗𝑡 + 𝑈𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
        In the baseline estimation, I test a linear probit model as denoted in equation (3.4) using the 
OLS method.  𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the marital status of an individual female (i) in city/county (j), which 
contains the value of one if the woman has ever been married in year (t) and zero otherwise; 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑗𝑡 is the measure of male earning inequality within a city/county in a year; 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector 
of the female personal attributes, such as age, education and income; 𝑀𝑗𝑡  is the vector of 
observable marriage market features, such as the sex ratio, average male income, and gender 
income gap; 𝑈𝑗𝑡 is a serial of controls for the unobserved year and geographic fixed effect as well 
as the time trends.  The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 follows a standard normal distribution, N(0,1) .  The key 
coefficient is (𝑎).  If (𝑎) is positive, woman (i) is more likely to marry in a city/county (j) with a 
higher male income inequality in year (t). 
        I employ marital status in the surveyed year as the dependent variable.23  Included women 
are aged from 20 to 34, which is the prime age range for females to marry and to reproduce.  To 
be specific, dummy variable 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 in equation (3.4) equals one if the woman has ever married, and 
zero if she has never married in year t.24  Since a married woman remains married in the sample 
even with a change in the male wage inequality in the city or county over time, keeping the 
repeated sample of married women in the estimation will cause a bias.  Therefore, I delete 
repeated married samples.  As a result, a woman will only appear once as “ever married” in the 
estimation sample.  For example, a woman married in 2004 will respond as “never married” 
                                                          
23
 “Age at first marriage” is a clear measure for marital timing, but the question about “age at first marriage” was 
only asked in the first wave of the surveys.  Even given the “age at first marriage”, it is impossible to match the 
information of the marriage market when marriage actually occurred with the woman in the sample within the same 
dataset.  Besides, I could not obtain the names of the rural counties and the other big city besides the capital from the  
public data.  Hence I could not match it with other datasets.   
    
24
 There are five possible choices, respectively "1" never married, "2" married", "3" divorced, "4" widowed, and 
"5" separated.   Women whose answer is among 2 to 5 are classified as “ever married”.   
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before 2004, and “ever married” in 2004.  Any observations of this woman after 2004 will be 
deleted.   
        The main explanatory variable is the income inequality among 20 to 50 years old males.  
Total income is probably a more important factor than wage in marital search.  If using wage 
inequality only, as in other literature, sample size will become much smaller especially for rural 
estimation.  In the baseline regression I use the Gini coefficient calculated by the income of 20 to 
50 years old males in a city or county in each year. 25  Income is calculated by the total real 
individual yearly income in the previous year.26  It includes all income sources from business, 
farming, fishing, gardening, livestock, non-retirement wages and the retirement wages.  
        I control for personal characteristics including age and education level in the baseline 
estimation.  I categorize the age variable into seven small blocks, and create one age dummy for 
each block, due to the small sample size at each age.  For example, there is one age dummy for 
women who are aged between 20 to 22 years except for exactly 22, one for those aged between 
22 to 24 years except for exactly 24, and so forth.  I create an indicator for education level 
according to the highest degree obtained by the respondents up to the survey year. 27  The 
indicator value is 3 if the woman has postsecondary degree, including technical or vocational, 
university or college, and master or higher degree; 2 if she has high school diploma; and 1 if she 
has a middle school education; and 0 if she has no education at all.  I define a marriage market as 
the group of prime age men and women in a city or county in one year.   
        There are other personal attributes such as wage and ethnicity to be considered.  The female 
wage or labor force participation could be added in order to control for the “female independence 
effect” on marriage propensity based on the literature review.  However, the missing values of 
such variables can lead to further attrition of samples.  By excluding females without work, the 
test also loses the comparison between working women and non-working women.  Therefore, I 
choose to exclude these variables in the baseline regression so that I could keep both working 
and non-working women in the sample.  According to the later robustness check, further 
controlling for the female wage or income does not change the basic results of the baseline 
estimation.  Moreover, I do not control for ethnicity, as the number of women reported to be in 
the national minority is only 112.  In addition, I cannot detect any statistical difference in marital 
status in the sample between women of a national minority and women of the Han ethnic group.   
        I control for the observable marriage market conditions including the average male income 
level, the income gap between genders and the sex ratio.  They are constructed by the original 
samples before dropping the repeated “ever married” observations.  Average male income is the 
arithmetic means of the log income values of all men aged from 20 to 50 in urban areas.   Mean 
gender income difference is calculated by the average male income minus average female 
                                                          
25
 I only use males’ income within this dataset to create inequality of income between males, because I cannot  
identify every city or county in order to match with other datasets.   
    
26
 The survey asks questions about individual’s income or wage in last year.  
    
27
 The options of question for education levels are “missing, 0 for none, 1 for graduated from primary school, 2 
for lower middle school degree, 3 for upper middle school degree, 4 for technical or vocational degree, 5 for 
university or college degree, 6 for master or higher”.  Here, primary school usually takes 6 and sometimes 5 years to 
finish; lower middle school takes 3 years; upper middles school also named high school takes 3 years; technical or 
vocational degree is professional training for students who don’t go to college.  The compulsory education requires 
young people to finish primary school and lower middle school education.  
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income aged from 20 to 50.  The sex ratio is calculated by the number of males divided by the 
number of females in the age range of 20 to 34 in each marriage market.   
        There are still unobserved marriage market features that may correlate with both the 
individual’s marital choice and the earning inequality.  I control for these unobserved factors by 
adding city or county fixed effects, national trends, provincial trend, and time trend within a city 
in urban area or a county in rural area.  I add dummies for the cities (or counties) to control for 
city (or county) fixed effect.  I further add dummies to indicate the province capital city for urban 
estimation.  I use a dummy variable for each wave of the survey as a year fixed effect.  Moreover, 
I use the value of the difference between the surveyed year and 1989 as year trends, the product 
of year trend and province dummies as province specific time trends, and further the product of 
year trend and city/county dummies as city/county specific time trends.   
        Finally, variables defined in a marriage market are in a higher aggregation level, say the 
city-year level, than individual units.  Meanwhile, there is a grouped structure of errors within a 
city in a year (Gould and Paserman 2003).   Hence, I cluster standard errors by city-year unit.  
There are 136 clusters in every specification included in the baseline estimation.   
        In the baseline estimation, there are 6,834 female observations with 2,241 urban female 
observations and 4,593 rural female observations.  They are collected from 1,807 urban women  
 
Figure 3.2 Proportions of Married Women by Age and Year in Samples for Baseline Estimation 
 
Notes: Each dot represents the proportion of married women among all women in a certain age range in a year.  
Specifically, the value is calculated by dividing the number of married women (who are married before current 
survey but after last survey or newly added married women) by the number of women (never married before last 
survey, or newly added) within the age range of 20 to 22, 22 to 24, 24 to 26 or 28 to 30 in each surveyed year.  Each 
age specification has eight values from the eight waves of the surveys, respectively 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2006, and 2009 in the baseline sample.  I exclude the dot where the number of women in the defined age 
group and year is smaller than 50.  This leads to 2, 4 and 4 missing dots respectively for age around 27, 31 and 33.  
Hence, the lines of those age range are not shown.   
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and 3987 rural women.  Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of married women within each age-year 
combination.  Within each year, the marriage rate generally increases as age increases.  The 
marriage rate around each age tends to decrease between 1989 and 2003, but tends to increase 
after 2003.   
        Table 3.2, part A, lists means of selected variables by year in the urban sample.  Sample  
 
Table 3.2 Sample Means of Women Aged 20 to 34 
Notes: The income is a constructed individual yearly income in the previous year (Yuan) inflated or deflated to the 
2006 value.  The Gini coefficient of male income, standard deviation and mean of males’ log income are calculated 
from the income of males aged from 20 to 50 within each city in the survey year.  Means of female log income are 
calculated from the income of females aged from 20 to 50 within each city in the survey year.  Values (except for 
the number of observations) shown are the mean value of variables averaged by females aged from 20 to 34 in each 
wave of the surveys.   
Variables Year 
1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
A. Urban 
        
Percentage of married women 0.77 0.31 0.21 0.63 0.48 0.58 0.43 0.57 
Age 26.61 23.33 23.38 26.42 25.52 26.65 29.23 26.29 
Percentage of illiteracy 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Percentage with only compulsory 
education 
0.53 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.38 0.34 0.26 0.27 
Percentage of high school graduates 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.16 0.18 
Percentage with postsecondary degree 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.39 0.40 0.56 0.54 
Std of male log income 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.81 0.87 
Mean male log income 8.07 8.21 8.42 8.69 8.92 9.17 9.55 9.74 
Mean female log income 7.91 8.02 8.29 8.42 8.71 8.92 9.11 9.48 
Gini of male income 0.41 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.38 
Sex ratio (20-34) 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.96 
Sex ratio (20-50) 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.89 0.91 
Number of observations 658 205 178 380 269 215 148 188 
B. Rural         
Percentage of married women 0.76 0.30 0.26 0.56 0.50 0.69 0.65 0.73 
Age 26.43 22.79 23.05 25.31 24.79 25.95 29.28 25.65 
Percentage of illiteracy 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Percentage with only compulsory 
education 
0.61 0.68 0.67 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.66 0.63 
Percentage of high school graduates 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Percentage with postsecondary degree 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.21 
Std of male log income 0.99 0.86 0.93 0.93 1.00 1.06 1.05 1.08 
Mean male log income 7.87 7.87 7.95 8.31 8.53 8.62 8.98 9.43 
Mean female log income 7.58 7.70 7.74 8.09 8.20 8.27 8.53 9.08 
Gini of male income 0.46 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.48 
Sex ratio (20-34) 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Sex ratio (20-50) 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.03 1.05 0.94 0.91 0.93 
Number of observations 1,311 493 466 792 659 326 242 304 
39 
 
means of education levels reflect a significant improvement in education of young urban females 
over the last 20 years.  The average male and female log income levels are increasing over years.  
I calculate two sex ratios for men and women who are within the age range of 20 to 34 and 20 to 
50 respectively.  The mean values of sex ratio tend to be smaller than typical results in other 
studies (Zhu et al. 2009).  It may be because that it is not a national representative sample and the 
sample size in each city during each year is limited.  Table 3.2, part B, shows the variable means 
for the rural sample.  With a larger sample size, the means of sex ratio are higher than urban 
results and become closer to typical results.  Nevertheless, the degree of the variation over time 
and across cities can still be informative.   
 
3.5 Results 
        I estimate the urban and rural samples separately using the baseline model (3.4).  I adopt 
five specifications: (1) controls for year fixed effect, national time trend, province and capital 
fixed effect; (2) controls for city fixed effect and national time trend; (3) controls for city fixed 
effect, national time trend and province-specific time trends; (4) controls for city fixed effect, 
national time trend and city-specific time trends; and (5) controls for year fixed effect, city fixed 
effect and the national time trend.  
 
3.5.1 Urban Baseline Estimation 
 
        For urban samples, in the first specification, I test the effect of cross-city variation of male 
income inequality on young female marriage propensity.  In addition to individual attributes and 
marriage market features, I control for national time trend, year fixed effect, province fixed 
effect, and the province capital fixed effect.  National time trend controls the economic, social or 
cultural trends in China over time, such as the long run economic growth and improvement of 
education level.  Year fixed effects account for the unobserved changes in each year which affect 
all cities, such as national policies that affect marriage formation.  Province fixed effect control 
for unobserved differences among provinces, such as special custom for marriage and different 
economic environments, and policies varying across provinces.  The dummy variable to indicate 
whether the city is the capital city accounts for the unobserved differences between capital and 
the other large city in the same province.   
        The results are shown in column (1) Table 3.3.  Marginal effects of selected variables are 
listed with robust standard errors.  The Gini coefficient has a significant positive impact on the 
propensity to get married for women aged 20 to 34 from 1989 to 2009.  The marginal effect has a 
value of 0.366 at the 5% significant level.  This means that when the Gini coefficient used to 
measure male income inequality in a city becomes 0.01 higher than the mean value, which is 
around 0.386, across all sampled cities, the probability to be married for women aged 20 to 34 
will be 0.366 percentage point higher than the mean value, which is around 60 percentage points.  
The absolute value of the marginal effect decreases with age.  The younger the women are, the 
less likely for them to be married. The propensity to marry before 30 is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, compared with the women around 33 years old.  Women who have finished 
about 9 years of compulsory schooling (middle school graduate degree) have a higher probability 
to be married than the illiterate young women by a marginal effect of 0.148.  That is to say, 
women who have completed the compulsory schooling are 14.8% more likely to get married  
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Table 3.3 Probability of Being “Ever Married” for Urban Women Aged 20-34 (1989-2009) 
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  The coefficients are the marginal effects of explanatory variables evaluated at 
means on the probability of being married estimated from a probit model.  The sample includes 2,241 female 
observations aged 20 to 34 collected from eight waves of surveys (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 
2009), which were answered by 1,807 unique women living in 18 urban cities including the province capitals of nine 
provinces (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou) in China.  
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted by city-year clusters.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: 0, never married; 1, ever married. 
Gini of male income 0.366** (0.181) 
0.604*** 
(0.233) 
0.637*** 
(0.244) 
0.602** 
(0.267) 
0.352* 
(0.187) 
Education 
Illiteracy _ 0.161*** (0.056) 
0.184*** 
(0.055) 
0.184*** 
(0.056) 
0.155*** 
(0.056) 
Compulsory education 0.148** (0.064) 
0.297*** 
(0.036) 
0.310*** 
(0.036) 
0.317*** 
(0.035) 
0.307*** 
(0.036) 
High school graduates -0.017 (0.065) 
0.135*** 
(0.032) 
0.144*** 
(0.032) 
0.148*** 
(0.032) 
0.147*** 
(0.031) 
Postsecondary 
Degree 
-0.169** 
(0.068) _ _ _ _ 
Age  
20≤age<22 
-0.763*** 
(-0.023) 
-0.771*** 
(0.023) 
-0.774*** 
(0.023) 
-0.740*** 
(0.024) 
-0.762*** 
(0.024) 
22≤age<24 
-0.633*** 
(0.040) 
-0.657*** 
(0.037) 
-0.660*** 
(0.038) 
-0.594*** 
(0.037) 
-0.630*** 
(0.041) 
24≤age<26 
-0.476*** 
(0.059) 
-0.500 
(0.055) 
-0.507*** 
(0.056) 
-0.400*** 
(0.050) 
-0.471*** 
(0.060) 
26≤age<28 
-0.312*** 
(0.076) 
-0.322*** 
(0.074) 
-0.328*** 
(0.075) 
-0.206*** 
(0.060) 
-0.306*** 
(0.077) 
28≤age<30 
-0.209*** 
(0.075) 
-0.232*** 
(0.074) 
-0.245 
(0.075) 
-0.114* 
(0.061) 
-0.203*** 
(0.075) 
30≤age≤32 
-0.114 
(0.083) 
-0.129 
(0.080) 
-0.136* 
(0.082) 
0.128* 
(0.072) 
-0.103 
(0.083) 
Sex ratio (20-34) -0.172 (0.163) 
-0.137 
(0.299) 
-0.228 
(0.304) 
-0.810** 
(0.379) 
-0.057 
(0.210) 
Mean male log income -0.007 (0.078) 
0.060 
(0.096) 
0.050 
(0.102) 
0.107 
(0.102) 
-0.001 
(0.102) 
Mean gender difference in log income -0.021 (0.080) 
-0.082 
(0.105) 
-0.046 
(0.111) 
-0.139 
(0.130) 
-0.025 
(0.081) 
Year Dummies Yes No No No Yes 
Year Trends National National National& Province 
National& 
City National 
Geographic fixed effects Province& Capital City City City City 
Number of city-year clusters 136 136 136 136 136 
Number of observations 2,241 2,241 2,241 2,241 2,241 
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than those who have no education.  But women with a postsecondary degree would delay 
marriage with a marginal effect of -0.169.  As a result, they are 16.9% less likely to get married 
compared with those illiterate women.   
        I control for the city fixed effect in the other four specifications shown in Table 3.3 column 
(2) to (5).  I explore the effect of the variation of male income inequality over time, in a city, on a 
woman’s marital propensity in that city.  In the second specification, there are controls for city 
fixed effect and national time trend.  The marginal effect of male income inequality measured by 
the Gini coefficient is 0.604 and significant at the 1% level.  This means when the women in a 
city experience a higher male income inequality over time, which is a deviation from the national 
trend, they are more likely to be married.  If the Gini coefficient for male income increases by 
0.01, the women’s propensity to get married increase by 0.604 percentage point compared with 
the mean of 60 percentage points.   
        In the third specification, I control for province-specific time trends in addition to all the 
controls in the second specification.  The marginal effect is 0.637, which has a greater magnitude 
than that in the second specification without province-specific time trends.  Hence, higher male 
income inequality in a city over time, which is a deviation from the provincial trend and national 
trend, may have positive effects on female marriage propensity.  If the male income Gini 
coefficient is higher than the mean, say 0.386, by 0.01, then the probability to get married for 
women aged 20 to 34 becomes 0.637 percentage point higher compared with the mean of 60 
percentage points.   
        In the fourth specification, I further control for the city-specific time trends.  It only 
identifies the variation of the male income Gini coefficient over time that is a deviation from the 
city-specific year trend in each city conditional on the national year trend.  The marginal effect is 
0.602 and significant at the 5% level.  Hence, if the male income Gini coefficient is 0.01 higher 
than the average value, the probability for a woman in that city to get married is 0.602 
percentage point higher than the average probability, about 60 percentage points.  
        In the last specification, I add both city fixed effect and year fixed effect, as well as the 
national year trend.  This is the most restrictive specification; it identifies the variation in the 
male Gini coefficient for a year, which is a deviation from the average level in that city.  In this 
case, the marginal effect is 0.352 at the 10% significant level, shown in the column (5) of Table 
3.3.  If the male income Gini coefficient has a value 0.01 higher than the average, the marriage 
propensity for women in the city to marry is 0.352 percentage point higher than the average 
(about 60 percentage points). 
        To better interpret the magnitude of the marginal effect, I display the prediction results of 
the marginal effects using the delta method in Table 3.4, part A.  I show the results by using 
different ways to change the value of the male income Gini coeffficent.  I include the prediction 
for the results of the first four specifications, which are all significant at the 5%.  For example, 
according to the result from the first specification in the baseline regression, a city with 10% 
higher male income inequality than the mean (mean*1.1) would lead to 1.4 percentage points 
higher propensity to marry among young females compared with other cities in the same year, 
where the average propensity to marry for a 20 to 34 years old woman, in a city, in the sample is 
60.2 percentage points.  According to the results from the fourth specification, when the male 
income inequality in the same city becomes one standard deviation bigger than before, which is 
0.485 compared with 0.386, marriage propensity among women aged 20 to 34 in that city 
becomes 5.8 percentage points higher than the mean over time, which is 59.9 percentage points.  
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Table 3.4 Predictions from Baseline Results 
Notes: The label column indicates the mean value of Gini coefficient and the value after different treatments.  
Column (1) to (4) reflects the specification (1) to (4) in the baseline regressions.  The top row indicates the mean 
probability to marry.  The following rows show the change from the mean probability due to the treatment.   
 
3.5.2 Urban Robustness Check 
       
        In Table 3.5, I show the robustness checks of the marginal effect of male income inequality 
on 20 to 34 years old females’ propensity to marry.  As suggested by the survey, to control for 
the design effect, it is better to control for the urbanization ratio and adjust standard errors by 
communities.  The income values are already adjusted by the urbanization ratios.  Hence, I 
further adjust standard errors by community-year units.  The coefficients are still significant with 
the same signs as in the baseline results.  
        I also investigate the impact with some alternative measures of the male income inequality.  
In previous literature, the standard deviation of male log wage is the main measure of male      
earning inequality.  When I use this measure for males aged 20 to 50, the results are positive, but 
insignificant.  This effect may be caused by a smaller sample size to calculate the standard 
deviation.  It is also possible that the Gini coefficient can reflect some unobserved factors, but 
the standard deviation cannot.  This possibility is examined in the discussion section below. 
        In addition to the standard deviation, I also use three other measures of the male income 
inequality, the 90/10 ratio, the 90/50 ratio and the 50/10 ratio.  The 90/10 ratio divides the male 
income ranked at the 90th percentile by that ranked at the 10th percentile in the male wage 
distribution.  The 90/50 ratio divides the income of the 90the percentile by the median.  It 
focuses on the income inequality in the upper tail of the distribution.  The 50/10 ratio, on the 
contrary, captures the income inequality in the lower tail of the distriubtion.  The coefficients are 
very small and insignificant for most specifications, except that in the specifications (3) and (4) 
 Predicted delta probability of being “ever married”  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Urban Sample mean probability 
 
0.602 0.595 0.597 0.599 
Mean Gini = 0.386 Difference from the sample mean probability 
Mean Gini+1*std =0.485 0.036 0.059 0.062 0.058 
Mean Gini+2*std =0.584 0.070 0.114 0.119 0.115 
Mean Gini*0.9 =0.347 -0.026 -0.023 -0.025 -0.024 
Mean Gini*1.1=0.425 0.014 0.024 0.025 0.023 
B. Rural Sample mean probability 
 
0.601 0.624 0.626 0.629 
Mean Gini = 0.437 Difference from the sample mean probability 
Mean Gini+1*std=0.525 0.023 0.055 0.050 0.069 
Mean Gini+2*std=0.613 0.039 0.107 0.099 0.133 
Mean Gini*0.9=0.393 -0.012 -0.029 -0.027 -0.038 
Mean Gini*1.1=0.481 0.011 0.028 0.025 0.035 
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there are negative results using the 50/10 ratio.  This indicates the time varying male income 
inequality in the lower tail deviated from the province-specific or city-specific year trends 
decreases the marital propensity of young females.  It is consistent with the fact that fewer 
marriageable men lead to fewer marriage. 
 
Table 3.5 Robustness Check of Probability of Being “Ever Married” for Urban Women Aged 20-
34 (1989-2009) 
Notes:  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Marginal effects of male income inequality on young urban female 
probability of being ever married are shown.  Column (1) to (5) is respectively consistent with the specification (1) 
to (5) in the baseline regression.  Standard errors are corrected by city-year (or community-year for row 2 only) 
clusters shown in parentheses.   
 
        I also check the alternative measures of some other variables.  An alternative sex ratio is to 
use all males and females aged 20 to 50.  It depicts a broader picture of sex imbalance than the 
sex ratio among 20 to 34 years old men and women. The coefficients are all positive and 
significant.  I use the mean income level to replace the mean log income as the indicator of the 
average income level in the city.  The results for the key explanatory variable are still positive 
Alternative measures 
Marginal effect of male income inequality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline results of male income 
Gini 
0.366** 
(0.181) 
0.604*** 
(0.233) 
0.637*** 
(0.244) 
0.602** 
(0.267) 
0.352* 
(0.187) 
Standard errors clustered in 
community-year 
0.366* 
(0.194) 
0.604*** 
(0.213) 
0.637*** 
(0.228) 
0.602** 
(0.259) 
0.352* 
(0.202) 
Alternative 
measures of 
male 
income 
inequality 
Std of male log 
income 
0.036 
(0.083) 
0.080 
(0.100) 
0.065 
(0.095) 
0.101 
(0.097) 
0.038 
(0.081) 
90/10 ratio 0.000317 ( 0.000224) 
-.0001378 
( 0.000345) 
-0.000353 
(0.000326) 
-0.000490 
(0 .000335) 
0.000246 
(0.000280) 
90/50 ratio -0.00821 (0 .0181) 
0.00450 
( 0.0234) 
0.00126 
(0.0232) 
0.000904 
(0.0239) 
-0.00936 
(0.0179) 
50/10 ratio .000566 (0 .000613) 
-0.00125 
( 0.000817) 
-0.00190* 
( .000787) 
-0.00226* 
( 0.000787) 
0.000237 
(0 .000778) 
Sex ratio 20-50 0.346* ( 0.178) 
0.598*** 
( 0.231) 
0.629*** 
(0.241) 
0.622** 
(0.257) 
0.350* 
(0.185) 
Average 
income 
 
Mean income all 20-
50 
0.326* 
(0.190) 
0.396* 
( 0.237) 
0.468* 
(0.261) 
0.381 
(0.281) 
0.303 
(0.200) 
Mean gender 
difference in income 
0.258 
(0.219) 
0.429 
(0.272) 
0.521* 
(0.287) 
0.493* 
(0.298) 
0.242 
(0.243) 
Restrict 
samples 
Female age 20-30 0.422** (0.186) 
0.661*** 
(0.250) 
0.666*** 
(0.260) 
0.665** 
( 0.284) 
0.394** 
(0.198) 
Female age 20-28 0.276 (0.220) 
0.266 
(0.247) 
0.219 
(0.252) 
0.116 
(0.278) 
0.141 
(0.211) 
Female with 
education 
0.434** 
(0.191) 
0.630*** 
(0.239) 
0.629** 
(0.249) 
0.675** 
(0.267) 
0.392** 
(0.195) 
Female with at least 
high school degree 
0.329 
(0.270) 
0.313 
(0.287) 
0.163 
(0.303) 
0.126 
(0.353) 
0.189 
(0.247) 
44 
 
and significant in the first three specifications at the 10% level.  Furthermore, using male mean 
income and the average gender difference in income, the marginal effect is still large and 
positive, but only significant at the 10% level in the third and fourth specifications. 
        I further test the baseline model based on different subsamples.  To this end, I divide the 
female sample by age.  Respectively, I check the results for women within the age range of 20 to 
30 or 20 to 28 in addition to the age range of 20 to 34.  I am unable to check the subsample of 
women aged between 28 and 34 due to a small sample size.  When restricted to 20 to 30 years 
old urban females, the magnitude of the positive effects on female propensity to marry is greater.   
However, it is not significant for a younger group of women aged from 20 to 28.  This implies as 
the inequality of male income increases, its accelerating effect on marriage is stronger for 
females between 28 and 30 years old, but not significant for those under the age of 28.   
        Finally, I test the subsamples separated by education level.  Excluding illiterate women, the 
results for all literate women are still positive and significant at the 5% level for all five 
specifications.  However, after dropping women without a high school diploma, the effect is no 
longer significant.  Hence, the impact of the male income inequality mainly affects women 
without a high school degree. 
 
3.5.3 Rural Baseline Estimation 
 
        The baseline estimation results for rural counties are shown in Table 3.6.  All specifications 
are the same as in the urban estimations, except that there is no province capital fixed effect for 
rural estimations.  In the first specification, the marginal effect of male income inequality is 
0.274 significant at the 5% level.  In the counties with a higher male income Gini coefficient 
than the mean (0.437) by the value of 0.01, rural females age 20 to 34 are 0.272 percentage point 
more likely to be married.  Compared with women having a postsecondary degree, women with 
only compulsory education and lower are more likely to marry before age 34.  However, the high 
school graduates are less likely to marry.  Compared with women aged between 28 and 30, 
younger females are less likely to be married, but elder females especially between 32 to 34 
years old are more likely to be married.  A higher sex ratio between men and women aged 20 to 
50 in a county increases the probability of rural females to be married before 34 years of age.           
        In the second specification, the marginal effect of male income inequality is 0.648, 
significant at the 1% level.  In the third specification, it is 0.597, significant at the 1% level.  In 
the fourth specification, with the county-specific time trend, the marginal effect becomes 0.831, 
significant at the 1% level.  Finally, in the fifth specification, with both county and year fixed 
effect as well as the national time trend, the effect of the male income Gini coefficient on female 
marriage propensity is no longer significant.   
        The effects of age and education on rural women’s marriage propensity are consistent 
across all five specifications.  As women get older in the rural areas, they are more likely to be 
married.  For estimations without year fixed effects, in the same county all literate women have 
lower propensity to marry than illiterate women.  The absolute value of the coefficient is the 
largest for women with a high school diploma and the smallest for women with only a 
compulsory education.  It indicates that in the same county, high school graduates are less likely 
to marry compared with women having a postsecondary degree.  Women with a postsecondary 
degree are less likely to marry compared with the women with only a compulsory education.  
Finally, the illiterate women are the most likely to marry among all women.   After controlling 
for the year fixed effect, we obtain a similar conclusion.  That is to say, in a certain year  
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Table 3.6 Probability of Being “Ever Married” for Rural Women Aged 20-34 (1989-2009) 
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Marginal effects of male income inequality on young urban female probability 
of being ever married are shown.  Column (1) to (5) is respectively consistent with the specification (1) to (5) in the 
baseline regression.  Standard errors are corrected by city-year (or community-year for row 2 only) clusters shown 
in parentheses.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: 0, never married; 1, ever married. 
Gini of male  income 0.272**  (0.138) 
0.648*** 
(0.149) 
0.597*** 
(0.145) 
0.831*** 
(0.168) 
0.109 
(0.128) 
Education  
Illiteracy 0.176*** (0.038) _ _ _ 
0.208*** 
(0.036) 
Compulsory education 0.119*** (0.030) 
-0.113*** 
(0.036) 
-0.115*** 
(0.036) 
-0.126*** 
(0.037) 
0.139*** 
(0.030) 
High school graduates -0.087** (0.038) 
-0.339*** 
(0.044) 
-0.336*** 
(0.044) 
-0.349*** 
(0.045) 
-0.086** 
(0.038) 
Postsecondary 
Degree _ 
-0.261*** 
(0.047) 
-0.258*** 
(0.048) 
-0.268*** 
(0.049) _ 
Age  
 
20≤age<22 
-0.706*** 
(0.024) 
-.0749*** 
(0.021) 
-0.748*** 
(0.022) 
-0.743*** 
(0.022) 
-0.725*** 
(0.023) 
22≤age<24 
-0.531*** 
(0.032) 
-0.588*** 
(0.031) 
-0.584*** 
(0.032) 
-0.574*** 
(0.033) 
-0.549*** 
(0.031) 
24≤age<26 
-0.343*** 
(0.036) 
-0.396*** 
(0.039) 
-0.390*** 
(0.039) 
-0.373*** 
(0.040) 
-0.358*** 
(0.036) 
26≤age<28 
-0.174*** 
(0.045) 
-0.209*** 
(0.045) 
-0.204*** 
(0.046) 
-0.194*** 
(0.046) 
-0.182*** 
(0.046) 
28≤age<30 _ -0.037 (0.050) 
-0.032 
(0.051) 
-0.022 
(0.051) _ 
30≤age≤32 
0.014 
(0.050) _ _ _ 
0.002 
(0.051) 
32≤age≤34 
0.133** 
(0.065) 
0.154** 
(0.062) 
0.155** 
(0.062) 
0.165** 
(0.061) 
0.139** 
(0.063) 
Sex ratio (20-50) 0.450*** (0.104) 
0.179 
(0.136) 
0.098 
(0.148) 
-0.034 
(0.155) 
0.433*** 
(0.118) 
Mean male log income 0.020 (0.046) 
0.115** 
(0.051) 
0.144*** 
(0.052) 
0.177** 
(0.060) 
-0.035 
(0.041) 
Mean gender difference in log income 0.013 (0.043) 
0.007 
(0.056) 
-0.005 
(0.055) 
0.038 
(0.061) 
0.030 
(0.045) 
Year Dummies Yes No No No Yes 
Year Trends National National National& Province 
National& 
County National 
Geographic fixed effects Province County County County County 
Number of county-year clusters 271 271 271 271 271 
Number of observations 4,593 4,593 4,593 4,593 4,593 
46 
 
compared to the women with a postsecondary degree, all other women, except for the high 
school graduates, are more likely to marry especially the illiterate women.   
        However, the effect of sex ratio on female marriage propensity is only significant after 
controlling for year fixed effect.  Hence, the difference of sex ratio between counties instead of 
that over time within a county has significant impact on female marriage propensity.  The 
marginal effect of sex ratio on female propensity to marry is 0.45 and significant at the 1% level 
in the first specification.  It is 0.433 and significant at the 1% level in the fifth specification.  If 
the sex ratio becomes bigger than the mean by 0.1, the propensity to marry for women becomes 
4.3 percentage points higher than the average level.  
        The impact of average male income of the county within a year on female marriage 
propensity is only significant after controlling for county fixed effect and province-specific time 
trends (or county-specific time trend) in addition to the national time trend.  It is not significant 
after controlling for year fixed effect.  Hence, a county should have higher female marriage 
propensity in the year when the average male income improves compared with the trend level in 
the county or the trend level in the province.  But in the same year, a county with higher average 
male income compared with other counties does not necessarily have a higher female marriage 
propensity.  The marginal effect of the mean log male income is 0.144, significant at the 1% 
level in the third specification, and 0.177 significant at the 5% level in the fourth specification.  
That is to say, a 10% higher value of mean male income within a county compared with the 
average level in the province leads to a 1.44 percentage point higher propensity to marry, than 
the average of 62.6 percentage points, for women in the county.  While a 10% higher value of 
mean male income within a county compared with the usual average level in the county leads to 
1.77 percentage points higher propensity, than the average probability of 62.9 percentage points, 
to marry for women in the county.  After controlling for the mean values of male log income, the 
income gap between genders does not have significant impact on female marriage propensity.  
Implicitly, change in the average female log income does not affect women’s marriage 
propensity.  
 
3.5.4 Rural Robustness Check  
 
        Table 3.7 presents the robustness check for the rural sample.  Since the rural sample is 
double the size of the urban sample, the results are generally more robust when compared to the 
urban sample.  There are no changes in the basic results by clustering standard errors in the 
community-year units instead of the county-year units.   
        The positive impact of male income inequality on female marriage propensity is more 
robust with the rural sample.  Like in the urban sample, after controlling for the county fixed 
effect and county-specific time trends, the 50/10 male income ratio has a significant impact on 
female marriage propensity.  The sign becomes positive and as a result that women are more 
likely to marry when the ratio of median male income over the male income ranked at the bottom 
10th percentile becomes higher in the county.  Moreover, the coefficients of some other 
measures for male income inequality become significant only with the rural samples.  Unlike the 
results with urban samples, the standard deviation of male income has a significant positive 
impact on a rural woman’s decision to marry, although the marginal effect is less than half of the 
magnitude in the baseline results.  Furthermore, with county fixed effect and province or county-
specific time trends, the 90/10 ratio could also explain the increase of female marriage 
propensity.  In addition, a higher 90/50 ratio among rural men significantly increases a rural 
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woman’s propensity to marry.  That is to say rural women are more likely to marry as the 
difference enlarges between male income ranked at the top 10th percentile and the median male 
income.     
 
Table 3.7 Robustness Check of Probability of Being “Ever Married” for Rural Women Aged 20-
34 (1989-2009)    
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Marginal effects of male income inequality on young rural female propensity 
to marry are shown.  Column (1) to (5) is respectively consistent with the specification (1) to (5) in the baseline 
regression.  Standard errors are corrected by county-year (or community-year for row 2 only) clusters shown in 
parentheses.    
 
        In comparison with the results for the urban estimation, I find that the coefficients for the 
sex ratio have exhibited interesting changes in the rural estimation.  In the estimation for urban 
women, the sex ratio for men and women at age 20 to 34 is only significant in the fourth 
specification with city fixed effect and city-specific time trends.  And the sign is negative, which 
indicates a higher sex ratio among young men and women below 34 deviated from the normal 
city trend over time is associated with lower marriage propensity for young women.  In the 
Alternative measures 
Marginal effect of male income inequality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline results of male income Gini 0.272**  (0.138) 
0.648*** 
(0.149) 
0.597*** 
(0.145) 
0.831*** 
(0.168) 
0.109 
(0.128) 
Standard errors clustered in 
community-year 
0.272** 
(0.145)   
0.648*** 
(0.145) 
0.597*** 
(0.148) 
0.831*** 
(0.160) 
  0.109 
(0.152) 
Alternative 
measures of 
male income 
inequality 
Std of male log 
income 
0.117* 
(0.068) 
0.239*** 
(0.079) 
0.221*** 
(0.078) 
0.273*** 
(0.089) 
0.015 
(0.070) 
90/10 ratio 0.000292 (0.000244) 
0.000682 
(0.000547) 
0.0009597* 
(0.000534) 
0.00127**    
(0.000550)   
0.0000361 
(0.000344) 
90/50 ratio 0.0388*** ( 0.0133) 
0.0452*** 
(0.0138) 
0.0399***   
(0.0134) 
0.0539*** 
(0.0155) 
0.02189**    
(0.0110) 
50/10 ratio 0.000194    (0.000537) 
0.00121    
(0.00138) 
0.00204    
(0.00133) 
0.00271**    
(0.00135) 
-0.000158    
(0.000811) 
Sex ratio 20-34 0.231 (0.142) 
0.634*** 
(0.148) 
0.579*** 
(0.144) 
0.838*** 
(0.165) 
0.077 
(0.131) 
Average 
income 
Mean income all 20-
50 
0.312* 
(0.189) 
0.387* 
(0.233) 
0.457* 
(0.259) 
0.395 
(0.271) 
0.298 
(0.198) 
Mean gender 
difference in income 
0.242 
(0.216) 
0.419 
( 0.270) 
0.514 
(0.286) 
0.491* 
(0.290) 
0.236 
(0.239) 
Restrict 
samples 
Female age 20-30 0.299** (0.151) 
0.680*** 
(0.163) 
0.635*** 
(0.158) 
0.909*** 
(0.181) 
0.119 
(0.142) 
Female age 20-28 0.341** (0.152) 
0.751*** 
(0.156) 
0.716*** 
(0.150) 
0.980*** 
(0.179) 
0.193 
(0.136) 
Female with 
education 
0.302* 
( 0.157) 
0.699*** 
(0.158) 
0.637*** 
(0.147) 
0.848*** 
(0.169) 
0.183 
(0.141) 
Female high school 
grad 
0.255 
(0.241) 
0.644*** 
(0.240) 
0.595*** 
(0.227) 
0.770*** 
(0.294) 
0.302 
(0.261) 
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robustness check for the urban sample, the measure of sex ratio for men and women aged 20 to 
50 always has a positive and significant relationship with female marriage propensity.  For rural 
samples, the relations of sex ratio among men and women below 34 above 20 with female 
marriage propensity are only significant and positive without year fixed effects.  On the contrary, 
the relationship of sex ratio within a broader age range, say 20 to 50, is only significant and 
positive with a year fixed effect.  Hence, for the rural women’s marriage decision, the differences 
in the sex ratio among young people below 34 over time in the same county matters and the 
changes in sex ratio for all men and women below 50 across counties in the same year also 
matters.  In both cases, a higher sex ratio is associated with more marriage for rural women. 
        Finally, results for rural women under different age groups are not the same as urban 
women.  The propensity to marry for rural women below 28 years old also increases when the 
male income inequality becomes higher in the same county over time, whereas for urban women 
below 28, there are no significant results.  Furthermore, the coefficient of the male wage 
inequality for 20 to 30 years old women’s marriage propensity becomes larger with the rural 
sample.  This is consistent with the notion that rural females tend to marry younger than urban 
females.  Besides, the propensity to marry increases not only for all literate rural women in 
general, but also for those with the minimum of a high school diploma when the male income 
inequality enlarges, especially within the same county. 
 
3.6 Discussion  
3.6.1 “Reservation Wage” Effect 
 
        How does one interpret these results?  To begin with, these results indicate that there might 
be a delay effect from a higher “reservation wage”, but the overall results are not dominated by 
the effect of higher “reservation wage”.  In general, the results show that as male income 
inequality increases, female propensity to marry tends to increase in both rural and urban areas.  
Since a higher reservation wage is mainly due to the increase in the wage inequality at the upper 
tail of the male wage distribution, the 90/50 ratio would be a better measure to check the impact 
of a higher “reservation wage” on female marriage propensity (Loughran 2002).  According to 
Table 3.7, the effect of a higher 90/50 ratio is always positive and significant in rural areas, 
although it is sometimes negative but not significant in urban areas (see Table 3.5).  Although the 
overall impact of male income inequality on urban women’s marriage propensity is positive, we 
also have obtained insignificant results for younger and higher educated urban women with the 
male income Gini coefficient as the male income inequality measure (see Table 3.5).  The 
assumption is that the increase in “reservation wage” may affect higher educated urban young 
women more than others.  It could be the case that the “reservation wage” effect has mixed with 
other competing effects, which leads to insignificant results for higher educated urban young 
women.  
        If the “reservation wage” effect is not dominant, it could be the case that the needed 
assumptions for the “reservation wage” effect to be dominant are not met.  If the assumption of 
well-behaved income distribution is violated in this Chinese sample, the “reservation wage” 
effect is no longer dominant.  It is highly possible that the income distribution among males in 
China is polarized.  In this case, the impact of a higher possibility to meet someone above the 
reservation wage dominates the “reservation wage” impact as discussed in section 3.2.2.  
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Meanwhile, the assumption that the majority of women are risk neutral may not be true in this 
sample.  Part of the women surveyed had stayed in the same city or county and participated in 
this survey more than once.  They may be more risk adverse than woman migrating out or newly 
migrating in to a city or county.  However, there is no evidence in the sample to verify this 
point.28   
 
3.6.2 Endogeneity  
 
        Are the results driven by endogeneity problems due to the lack of control on the female 
economic status?  Theoretically, the link between male income inequality and female marriage 
formation can be formed by a missing variable regarding the women’s economic performance.  
On one hand, women’s career development will affect their marital timing.  On the other hand, 
women’s wage changes can affect male wage inequality (Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle 2004).  
Female wage gains could be male wage losses, and female wage distribution is linked to male 
wage distribution when the overall wage distribution remains stable over time (Fortin and 
Lemieux 2000).  Besides, women's earning power determines their husbands' expected future 
earnings (Sweeney and Cancian 2004). 
        To check this endogeneity problem, in Table 3.8 I add the individual woman’s income or 
log income control variable in addition to the female age and her education level into the 
baseline regression.  Due to missing values from women without work, the number of 
observations drops from 2,241 in the baseline to 1,697 by using income and 1,671 by using log 
income.  With both measures, the magnitude for the coefficient of male income Gini coefficient 
is positive and only a little bit smaller than that in the baseline results for the urban sample, but 
greater for rural sample.  It is possible that the effect of male income inequality on rural female 
marriage propensity is underestimated due to the lack of control for women’s income.  There is 
little evidence, however, to indicate that the observed effects of male income inequality are 
mainly due to the impact of the female own income on her marriage decision. 
 
3.6.3 Reverse Causality 
 
        The causality could run the opposite way, which would be that the change in income 
inequality among men is due to the change in the propensity to marry among women.  For 
example, consider that the marriage rate among young men becomes smaller because women 
choose to marry later.  It could be the case if women prefer to marry men with similar or older 
age (Buss 1989; Higgins et al. 2002).  Meanwhile, there is wage premium for men after they 
marry (Korenman and Neumar 1991; Gray 1997; Chun and Lee 2001; Ahituv and Lerman 2007).  
We also know that there is larger variation in wage for single men compared with married men 
(Blackburn 1990).  Hence, less marriage among young men can be associated with changes in 
the inequality levels of male earnings.   
        In order to check this reverse causality issue, I only use the Gini coefficient among married 
males aged 20 to 50 as an explanatory variable (see Table 3.8).  Usually, it is easier for a woman 
to observe or detect the change in the income inequality of all men as a whole than that of young 
men only.  Among all 20,457 male observations with income between age 20 and 50, single men 
                                                          
    
28
 There are no notable differences of the income, education level, and parents’ cadres status (whether they are 
public servants or not) between women who stay in the sample and those who are either newly added or only 
occurring once in the survey. 
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are only 15.39%.  The income inequality of married men can substantially change female 
marriage decision-making in the same way as the overall male income inequality does.  Using 
married men’s income Gini coefficient, results obtained are very similar with the baseline results.  
Most of coefficients for both urban and rural female samples have greater magnitudes compared 
with those obtained from the baseline estimations.  Theoretically, female marriage propensity 
cannot affect the male income inequality among married men.  Therefore, change in female 
marital propensity is the result, not the cause of male income inequality. 
 
Table 3.8 Endogeneity, Reverse Causality and Other Mechanisms 
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Marginal effect of different income inequality measurements on age 20 to 34 
urban/rural female’s marriage propensity is shown.  Column (1)-(5) is respectively consistent with the specification 
one to five in the baseline regression.  Controls are the same with baseline estimations if change is not mentioned.  
Standard errors are in parentheses either corrected by city-year or county-year clusters.   
 
3.6.4 Risk and Uncertainty 
 
        Could the link between male income inequality and female marriage propensity be formed 
due to their association with the income risk and social uncertainty?  We know that the income 
from men is usually the most important income source for a Chinese family.  An enlarged 
income inequality among men would increase the income risk and social uncertainty for the 
Key explanatory variable 
Marginal effect of the key explanatory variable on female being 
“ever married” (age 20-34) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Urban Female 20-34 
Male income Gini  
Control female log 
income 
0.289 
(0.212) 
0.592** 
(0.268) 
0.544* 
(0.297) 
0.598* 
(0.334) 
0.337 
(0.226) 
Control female 
income 
0.270 
(0.205) 
0.576** 
(0.260) 
0.557* 
(0.290) 
0.625* 
(0.327) 
0.302 
(0.219) 
Married male income Gini  0.385* (0.214) 
0.642*** 
(0.230) 
0.707*** 
(0.255) 
0.725*** 
(0.251) 
0.376** 
(0.194) 
Income Gini for all people (men & women)  0.139 (0.199) 
0.448 
(0.291) 
0.543* 
(0.293) 
0.580* 
(0.298) 
0.115 
(0.215) 
Female income Gini  -0.159 (0.137) 
0.104 
(0.223) 
0.150 
(0.213) 
0.253 
(0.213) 
-0.184 
(0.145) 
Rural Female 20-34 
Male income Gini  
Control female log 
income 
0.352** 
(0.158) 
0.750***  
(0.163) 
0.700*** 
(0.160) 
0.929*** 
(0.178) 
0.223 
(0.143) 
Control female 
income 
0.321** 
(0.157) 
0.749*** 
(0.166) 
0.686*** 
(0.157) 
0.899*** 
(0.177) 
0.194 
(0.143) 
Married male income Gini  0.307** (0.140) 
0.670** 
(0.144) 
0.633*** 
(0.137) 
0.797*** 
(0.160) 
0.187 
(0.123) 
Income Gini for all people (men & women)  0.323* (0.180) 
0.894*** 
(0.197) 
0.856*** 
(0.186) 
1.084*** 
(0.222) 
0.162 
(0.157) 
Female income Gini  0.063 (0.170) 
0.474** 
(0.222) 
0.453** 
(0.216) 
0.598** 
(0.242) 
0.088 
(0.164) 
51 
 
society.  It is very likely that enlarged income inequality of males just reflects part of the 
exaggeration of overall income inequality in the society.  Therefore, income inequality affects 
female marriage formation through the impact of income risk and social uncertainty on marriage, 
the income inequality among men and women should both change the propensity for females to 
marry.   
        In order to test this hypothesis, I replace the Gini coefficient of male income with that of all 
individuals aged from 20 to 50.  The results are relatively weaker for urban residents, but 
stronger for rural residents.  For specifications (3) and (4), controlling for city fixed effect and 
province or city specific time trend, the total income inequality has positive effect on marriage 
propensity of young females, which is significant at the 10% level.  For rural females, an 
increase in the overall income Gini coefficient in a county within a year could lead to an increase 
in the propensity to marry, which is better than the male income Gini coefficient under all five 
specifications. 
        Likewise, if the income risk and social uncertainty is the mechanism for male income 
inequality to impact female marriage formation, female income inequality should have a similar 
effect on female marriage propensity as male income inequality does.  I calculate female income 
inequality using women aged from 20 to 50.  In urban areas, female income inequality has no 
effect on their marriage propensity.  But in rural areas, the increase in the female income 
inequality also significantly increases young females’ propensity to marry.   
        In summary, a rural woman’s marriage propensity can be affected by the increase in income 
inequality among only males, only females and all people.  By contrast, the urban female marital 
decision-making is only affected by the male income inequality and the income inequality 
among all people.  Given all that, income risk and social uncertainty is considered to be a more 
influential factor for rural women than for urban women in linking their marriage propensity to 
the income inequality.    
 
3.6.5 Men’s Marital Decision  
 
        Men’s marital decision cannot be neglected.  Women’s economic gains are starting to 
resemble those of men in a modern family (Oppenheimer 1988; Okun 2001; Sweeney 2002).  
Men may follow the same strategy as women do in a marital search.  A marriage trend may 
result from similar decision-making processes used by both men and women.  Other than 
searching, it usually takes time for high ability men to signal their quality to prospective women 
in order to marry a desired partner (Bergstrom and Bagnoli 1993).  Some men prefer to spend 
more time in their career than in maintaining a relationship.  While, others may prefer to marry 
early, since marriage also improves the earnings of men. 
        As shown in Table 3.9, I regress a young man’s marriage propensity on the income 
inequality among men, women and all people.  I include men aged between 22 and 34 years 
old.29  The results show that the urban/rural men’s marriage propensity increases when the 
income inequality among urban/rural men increases except for the last specification where I 
control for both city (county) and year fixed effects and the city-specific (county-specific) time 
trend.  It is true even after controlling for the log value of the male income, given there is no year 
fixed effect.  These results are not due to reverse causality since it is still robust after using the  
 
                                                          
    29 For urban estimation, the samples size is 1,953 and 1,540 after controlling own income.  For rural estimation, it 
becomes 4,049 and 3,033 after controlling own income. 
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Table 3.9 Probability of Being “Ever Married” for Urban or Rural Men Aged 22-34 (1989-2009)          
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Marginal effects of different income inequality measurements on age 22 to 34 
urban or rural male marital decision-making are shown.  Column (1) to (5) is respectively consistent with the 
specification (1) to (5) in the baseline regression.  Controls are individual male education and age and sex ratio, 
mean log income of males and average log income gender difference in marriage market for the baseline.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses either corrected by city-year or county-year clusters.   
 
Gini coefficient of income among only married men.  The Gini coefficient for income among all 
people also has a positive effect on the marital propensity of men in both rural and urban samples 
after controlling for a city/county fixed effect and the province-specific or city-specific (county-
specific) time trends.  However, only in the rural sample, after controlling for the county fixed 
effect and the province-specific or county-specific time trend, men will have higher marriage 
propensity when there is higher income inequality among women. 
        The reasons for these results from male samples might be the following.  Firstly, men 
follow the same marital search strategy as women do especially in rural areas.  As income 
inequality of women increases, there are competing effects on the possibility to marry.  In rural 
areas, the promotion effect caused by the higher possibility for a man to accept an offer at a 
given “reservation wage” is dominant.   Moreover, men just want to marry and get more secure 
as women do when inequality is higher in the society.   Therefore, when income inequality of 
men becomes larger, both rural and urban young men have higher demand for marriage.  Finally, 
more men can get married because more women decide to marry.  The impact of the male 
Key explanatory variable 
Marginal effect on  male being “ever married” 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Urban men  
Male income 
Gini  
Baseline 0.376* (0.224) 
0.505* 
(0.260) 
0.607** 
(0.273) 
0.515* 
(0.284) 
0.320 
(0.209) 
Control log 
income 
0.382 
(0.240) 
0.475* 
(0.280) 
0.579* 
(0.305) 
0.665** 
(0.340) 
0.255 
(0.232) 
Married male income Gini  0.367* (0.197) 
0.479** 
(0.230) 
0.562** 
(0.241) 
0.502* 
(0.263) 
0.257 
(0.190) 
Income Gini for all people (men 
& women) 
0.343 
(0.253) 
0.455 
(0.301) 
0.610** 
(0.269) 
0.539* 
(0.326) 
0.208 
(0.227) 
Female income Gini 0.038 (0.218) 
0.187 
(0.234) 
0.253 
(0.226) 
0.278 
(0.240) 
-0.073 
(0.174) 
Rural men 
Male income 
Gini  
Baseline 0.292* (0.162) 
0.671*** 
(0.194) 
0.630*** 
(0.142) 
0.854*** 
(0.150) 
0.189 
(0.144) 
Control log 
income 
0.243 
(0.159) 
0.753*** 
(0.164) 
0.718*** 
(0.152) 
0.926*** 
(0.174) 
0.117 
(0.141) 
Married male income Gini  0.242 (0.148) 
0.616*** 
(0.143) 
0.587*** 
(0.140) 
0.787*** 
(0.147) 
0.165 
(0.130) 
Income Gini for all people (men 
& women) 
0.312 
(0.203) 
0.880*** 
(0.207) 
0.855*** 
(0.189) 
1.140*** 
(0.216) 
0.223 
(0.180) 
Female income Gini 0.076 (0.187) 
0.417 
(0.226) 
0.421* 
(0.219) 
0.611* 
(0.249) 
0.082 
(0.177) 
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income inequality or the income inequality among all people on the urban/rural women leads to 
the change in the marriage propensity observed for urban/rural men. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
        This paper shows that Chinese women aged between 20 and 34 are more likely to marry, 
when income inequality among men is higher in a city or county in a year, so called a “marriage 
market”.  The results are obtained by applying a linear probit model to around 2,200 female 
observations from 18 urban cities and 4,600 female observations from 36 rural counties over 
year 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009.  Results are conditional on the 
woman’s age, education and her own income as well as the sex ratio, mean male income level, 
and average income gap between genders in the marriage market.  The effects are usually 
stronger after controlling for the province-specific time trend or the city/county-specific time 
trend.  A one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient for men in the county or city 
increases the propensity to marry for women aged from 20 to 34 by 5.8 percentage points in 
urban areas and by 6.9 percentage points in rural areas (see Table 3.4 specification (4)).  
        Two theories could explain the positive effect of male income inequality on female 
marriage propensity.  The first is based on the marital search theory given a more polarized 
income distribution in China.  The effect of higher probability to meet someone with income 
above the “reservation wage” level dominates the delay effect of a higher “reservation wage” 
when there is higher male income inequality.  Another reason is that an increase in the income 
risk and social uncertainty due to a higher income inequality makes marriage more attractive for 
both young Chinese men and women.   
        The link between male income inequality and female higher probability to marry is not due 
to the endogeneity from the woman’s own income.  It is not caused by reverse causality.  The 
results are also robust with respect to a variety of checks with different variable measurements 
and subsamples.   
        In general, the effects are more significant for rural, lower educated, and older women.  
Results for rural areas are not sensitive to the selection of age range and education levels.  
However, in urban areas, women with education higher than that of a high school graduate 
degree and those before age 28 do not have a significant increase in their marriage propensity 
under a higher income inequality of men.  In rural area, a higher 90/50 ratio increases female 
marriage propensity, whereas a higher 50/10 ratio reduces marriage propensity.  For urban 
females, when making marital decisions, the change in income inequality among all individuals 
or only among women is not as important as the change in the income inequality among men.  
But a rural woman would change her marriage propensity based on a different level of income 
inequality among all men, or among all women, or even among all people.   
        Male marriage propensity may interact with female marriage propensity.  Young men 
before age 34 would like to accelerate marriage under higher income inequality among men or 
among all people, which is not because of the reverse causality.  Higher female income 
inequality also increases a rural man’s propensity to marry.   
        In conclusion, this paper demonstrates the impact of income inequality on the marriage 
formation in China.  It provides a new perspective on understanding the influences of income 
inequality and the reasons of marriage propensity changes in China.  It emphasizes the 
importance of family functions and the higher desirability of marriage under severely rising 
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income inequality.  Given a unique socioeconomic background in China, marriage is more 
desirable under a higher income inequality, especially for the rural residences, the elder and 
lower educated men or women.  Though the propensity to marry is higher under substantial 
increase of income inequality, the actual marriage rate is not necessarily higher given the effects 
of some other factors such as an unbalanced sex ratio.  For rural men with low income the high 
sex ratio decreases their marriage rate.  Therefore, the rising income inequality adds more 
conflicts in the reality of marriage formation in China.   
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 
 
        This dissertation builds upon the work of Loughran (2002) and the Gould and Paserman 
(2003), which associates female marital decision-making with male wage inequality in the U.S.  
It has been argued that under a marital search framework, women will delay marriage because 
the minimum acceptable wage of their potential partners for a woman to marry becomes higher 
in the situation that male wage inequality becomes larger in a metropolitan area in a year in the 
U.S.   
        However, to claim these effects to be causal, there are still endogeneity and reverse 
causality problems.  Previous studies (Loughran 2002; Gould and Paserman 2003; Kuo 2008) 
only address these problems by controlling for the metropolitan area fixed effect and the time 
trend in the county or in each metropolitan area.  To solve this problem, in Chapter 2, I apply 
skill-biased technological shock in a metropolitan area in a year as an instrument for the male 
wage inequality following the example of Mocan and Unel (2011).  To facilitate the usage of this 
instrument, I measure the male wage inequality by the wage gap between high and low educated 
men.  High educated is defined as with some college or higher education and vice versa.    
        As a result, I discover that a low educated woman’s marriage propensity becomes lower but 
a high educated woman’s marriage propensity becomes higher when there is an increase in the 
wage ratio between high and low educated men.  The data is from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. 
Censuses as well as the 2007 American Community Survey.  This helps to explain why the 
marriage decline for high educated women becomes slower than that for low educated women.  
The impact of the male wage gap between high and low educated men on marriage propensity of 
women roughly accounts for 1/5 of the changes in the marriage rate for women in the last two 
decades. 
        In addition, in the chapter 3, I apply similar models as in Gould and Paserman (2003) to 
Chinese data in order to find more evidence about the underlying impact of the male income 
inequality on female marriage propensity.  It turns out that there is an opposite impact in China 
by utilizing data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey.  Instead of a marital delay, I find 
that for women aged between 20 and 34 a one-standard-deviation increase in the Gini coefficient 
of male income increases a woman’s probability of being married by 5.8 percentage points in 
urban areas and 6.9 percentage points in rural areas from 1989 to 2009.  This is conditional on 
the female personal characteristics such as the woman’s age and education and the city or county 
characteristics including the sex ratio, overall income level and gender wage gap.  In addition, I 
control for the year fixed effect and/or city (county) fixed effect as well as different levels of 
regional-specific year trends. The results could be explained by the polarized income distribution 
and the essential functions of marriage as a social security net-work and a risk sharing union in 
the Chinese society, which are not consistent with the U.S. context.   
        To summarize, changes in the earning inequality among men could significant impact 
women’s decision to get married.  However, the impact exhibits different features in a western 
country like the U.S. and in an eastern country like China.  In the U.S., the groups of people who 
are relatively disadvantaged in the labor market, such as those with less skill or lower education, 
seem to become less likely to marry under a larger wage gap between high and low skilled 
workers.  The skill-biased technological change not only drives up the wage gap between high 
and low educated men but also close the original gap between high and low educated women’s 
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marriage rates.  White and non-white women are both affected by the wage gap between high 
and low educated men, where the impact seems to be larger for non-white women.   
        In China, most women are more likely to marry in response to a higher male income 
inequality.  Both rural and urban Chinese women react to the change in the male income 
inequality especially to the variation of the male income inequality over time within a rural 
county or an urban city.  And the impact is more robust for rural women.  Polarization in the 
income distribution in the income inequality further boosts the demand for marriage.  Not only 
the male income inequality but also the income inequality among all men and women could 
increase people’s propensity to marry in the rural area or for people without a high school degree 
in the urban area. 
        An explanation of the opposite impact found from the two countries could rely on the 
differences in the assumptions of the marital search theory.  Specifically, when there are changes 
in the shape of the male wage/income distribution, the impact of the male wage/income 
inequality on female marriage propensity in the marital search process could be different 
according to the search theory.  Meanwhile, the development of social security system interacts 
with the impact of income or wage inequality on marriage formation.  Countries with a better 
social security system like the U.S., when compared with China, may experience more severe 
marriage delay.   
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Supplementary Materials for Chapter 2 Section 2.4 Data  
        I keep individuals aged between 17 to 65 years old in the sample.  The years of education 
are 0 (N/A or no schooling), 2 (nursery school to grade 4), 6 (grade 5,6,7 and 8), 9 (grade 9), 10 
(grade 10), 11 (grade 11), 12 (grade 12), 13 (1 year of college), 14 (2 years of college), 15 (3 
years of college), 16 (4 years of college) and 18 (5+ years of college).  “Years of experience” is 
the minimum value between possible years of experience (age minus 16 minus years of 
education) and legal years of working (age minus 16).  I drop these with negative value of 
experiences30. In addition to original race indicator, I also categorize all other races except for 
white into one big race category called “non-white”.  There are occupation dummies for 7 
aggregate categories based on 1990 classification method.  They are respectively, “Managerial 
and Professional”, “Technical, Sales, and Administrative”, “Service”, “Farming, Forestry, and 
Fishing”, “Precision Production, Craft, and Repairers”, “Operatives and Laborers”, and “Non-
occupational responses”. 
        In order to calculate the wage gap between high and low educated men, I divide samples 
into 32 efficiency groups, which were jointly defined by 2 genders, 4 education levels and 4 
experience groups. The four education category indicators are respectively less than or equal to 
11 years, 12 years, 13 to 15 years, and equal to or more than 16 years of education.  The four 
experience groups are 0 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to 29 and 30 or more years of experience31. High 
educated (skilled) individuals are defined as persons with some college and more education, i.e. 
education categories 3 and 4, and low educated (skilled) are defined as persons with high school 
or lower education, i.e. education categories 1 and 2.  
        Further, for the later calculation of race-specific male wage gap, I will also add the race 
indicator as another dimension.  There are two broad race categories, white and non-white.  With 
this additional dimension on race, I create 64 efficiency groups.  For instance, group 1 contains 
white male with less than or equal to 11 years of education and 0 to 9 years of experience and 
group 2 is non-white male with same other features as group 1.  Although, experience group 
indicators are not used explicitly in the calculation, this division ensures the precision of the 
constructed variables calculated within each group, which follows related literatures, such as 
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008).      
        For simplicity, let me call the current sample “raw sample”.  The general version of sex 
ratio is calculated by the number of men aged 21 to 40 divided by the number of women aged 21 
to 35 in “raw sample”.  I also separate samples by race and education groups and calculate the 
corresponding within group sex ratio.  For example, for the estimation of white female with 
higher education, I calculate the sex ratio between high educated white men aged 21 to 40 and 
high educated white women aged 21 to 35. 
                                                          
30 It is possible to have -1 or -2 experience value due to slightly different beginning age of education or the period 
of education for a certain degree level. I keep these observations and give them years of experience value of 0. 
31
 To be specific, the first 16 groups are for males and other 16 groups are for females.  Group 1-8 and 17-24 are 
low educated persons who has fewer than or equal to 12 years of education, equivalent to high school graduates. 
Group 9-16 and 25-32 are high educated persons, who have at least some college education. Group 1,9,17 and 25 are 
within the first experience group, 2,10,18 and 26 are within the second experience group and so on. 
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        I adopt workers worked for full hours and full time (FHFT) last year, whose weekly hours 
worked are more than 35 hours and weeks worked are more than 40 weeks.  I exclude self-
employed individuals and those with no salary and income wage.  I calculate hourly wages by 
dividing the total wage and salary income by the product of usual hours worked each week and 
weeks worked last year.  According to Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), I “drop the bottom 1% 
of hourly earners and multiply hourly wage of top-coded earners by 1.5”.  I “limit the maximum 
hourly wage to 1.5 times the maximum annual income amount divided by 1750 (35 hours per 
week for 50 weeks per year)”.  The top-coding values are $140,000 in the 1990 Census, 
$175,000 in the 2000 Census and $200,000 in the 2007 ACS32.  I adjust the nominal value to 
year 2005 real value according to the PCE factors from Bureau of Economic Analysis33.  Let me 
call this restricted sample “labor sample”. Using “labor sample” I construct the explanatory 
variable and instrumental variable.  
 
A.1 Efficiency-Adjusted Male Wage Ratio and Technological Change Ratio 
 
        According to Mocan and Unel (2011), I construct the efficiency-adjusted labor inputs and 
earnings.  In my labor samples, there are 32 groups (g).  Efficiency-adjusted ratio (q) is 
calculated by the arithmetic mean of the relative wage ratios in the group compared with that in 
the base group say group 1 ( males with less than 12 years of education and less than 10 years of 
experience) for each group in each metropolitan area in each year.  I denote 𝑤𝑔𝑚𝑡 as the average 
weekly earnings in each group of each metropolitan area in each year, which is weighted by the 
product of individual’s person weight and weeks worked last year.  I denote 𝑁𝑔𝑚𝑡  as the 
weighted sum of total weeks worked in that group of that metropolitan area in year t.  Then I can 
get the total efficient adjusted labor supply of high (𝐻𝑚𝑡) and low (𝐿𝑚𝑡) educated workers in 
each metropolitan area in each year, and also the corresponding wage for high (𝑊ℎ𝑚𝑡) and low 
(𝑊𝑙𝑚𝑡) educated workers in each metropolitan area in each year using following equations. 
 
(A.1) 𝐻𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝑞𝑔𝑁𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑔∈𝐺𝐻  ,   𝐿𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝑞𝑔𝑁𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑔∈𝐺𝐿  
 
(A.2) Whmt = ∑ wgmtNgmtHmt   ,   g∈GH Wlmt = ∑
wgmtNgmt
Lmt
g∈GL     
                           
        Here, h and l indicates education category, m indicates metropolitan area, and t indicates 
year. Then, I calculate technological shock ratio denoted as AR=ln(Ah/Al) from equation (2.8) as 
follows.  
 
(A.3)  𝑊ℎ𝑚𝑡
𝑊𝑙𝑚𝑡
= (
𝐴ℎ𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑙𝑚𝑡
)
𝜎−1
𝜎
(
𝐻𝑚𝑡
𝐿𝑚𝑡
)
−
1
𝜎
                                                    
 
                                                          
32
 The top-coding values are referred to IPUMS data description and David Autor’s code. 
33
 “Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product” BEA Table 2.3.4 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=64&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Pla
ce=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=1969&LastYear=2011&3Place=N&Update=Update&J
avaBox=no#Mid  The relevant value for the PCE is  69.025 in 1989,  87.636 in 1999 and 105.499 in 2007. Use 2007 
value PCE for 2007 ACS is consistent with David Autor’s code in which he uses 2008 PCE value for 2008 ACS 
data. 
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        Assume 𝜎 = 1.6.  We can get the following: 
 
(A.4) 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑙𝑛 (𝐴ℎ
𝐴𝑙
) = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐴ℎ𝑚𝑡
𝐴𝑙𝑚𝑡
) = 2.667 ∗ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑊ℎ𝑚𝑡
𝑊𝑙𝑚𝑡
) + 1.667 ∗ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐻𝑚𝑡
𝐿𝑚𝑡
)             
         
        I use the same (q) value and apply the similar procedures in (2.5) in calculating male wage 
gap.  I restricted samples to include only men and calculate wage gap between high educated and 
low educated male workers aged 21 to 40.  And finally I use the logarithm of the wage ratio as 
the key explanatory variable denoted by ln (𝜔𝑀𝐻 𝜔𝑀𝐿⁄ )𝑚𝑡. 
 
A.2 Composition-Adjusted Male Wage Ratio and Technological Change Ratio 
       
        An alternative measure of earnings is the composition-adjusted male wage ratio.  As in 
Autor et al. (2008), this measure adjusts the male wage ratio according to the proportion of each 
group’s labor input over that of all groups.  Hence, the average earnings are not fluctuated by the 
change in each category, defined by gender, education and experience.  Follow Mocan and Unel 
(2011), the composition index for each group (𝑛𝑔𝑚) is calculated by the arithmetic mean of  
𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡 over three waves of the surveys in each metropolitan area, where 𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝑁𝑔𝑚𝑡/ ∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑔 .  
Then, the composition-adjusted weekly wage is calculated as follows. 
 
(A.5) 𝑊ℎ𝑚𝑡 =
∑ 𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑤𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑔∈𝐺𝐻
∑ 𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑔∈𝐺𝐻
, 𝑊ℎ𝑚𝑡 =
∑ 𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑤𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑔∈𝐺𝐿
∑ 𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑔∈𝐺𝐿
.                             
       
The rest of the calculation is as same as the efficiency-adjusted ratio.  
 
A.3 Race-Specific Male Wage Ratio 
 
        To calculate the race-specific male wage ratio, I divided the sample in each year into 64 
groups. Odd groups are for white and even groups are for non-white observations.  Thus, the 
mean wage ratio within each group is defined by the mean wage over all individuals who have 
the same race, gender, education and experience indicators.  And the total weeks worked is also 
calculated within the newly defined groups.  
        The technological shock ratio is still defined as the demand ratio among all high and low 
educated workers.  The male wage ratio for all is calculated by all male workers using similar 
procedures except for the value of within group variables are different, since there are 64 groups 
instead of 32 groups.  However, the white male wage ratio is restricted to only high and low 
educated white males.  The non-white male wage ratio is for only high and low educated non-
white males. 
        Table (A.2) presents the number of observations in each metropolitan area to calculate male 
wage gap and technological change ratio for cases with 32 groups.  It also shows the number of 
observation in each group within the largest metropolitan area and one of the smallest 
metropolitan areas included in the sample.  I use individuals within each group of metropolitan 
area to calculate the mean wage ratio of each group, 𝑤𝑔𝑚𝑡 used in equation (A.5).  Typically, 
sample size is around 370 in each group of a moderate size metropolitan area.  
        After the variable, I select female aged 21 to 35 in “raw sample” of three years. And I 
further delete all individuals migrated within last 5 years only in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, 
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given the information missing in the 2007 ACS.  I then merge the three samples respectively 
with files containing constructed variables.  
        Finally, I merge samples from these three waves of the surveys into one big panel by 
metropolitan area index.  I construct two race dummies (black/white or black/non-white), three 
year dummies, 212 metropolitan specific year trends and clusters defined by metropolitan area, 
year and age, which means all females with same age in the same metropolitan area in the same 
year are in one cluster.  
 
Table A.1 Observation Deleted Due to Partial Identification in the Metropolitan Areas 
Note: Code “N/A” represents the unidentified individuals in the metropolitan area which is more than 70% 
identified. 
Number Name 
Observation deleted 
1990 2000 2007 
0 N/A 4,439,982 4,172,071 823,400 
1 Lawrence-Haverhill, MA/NH 6,047 13,012 2,663 
2 Bridgeport, CT 11,915 17,304 3,318 
3 Brockton, MA 5,520 12,872 2,566 
4 Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN/KY 4,721 5,957 1,431 
5 Columbus, GA/AL 0 9,065 1,856 
6 Flint, MI 15,994 9,243 1,663 
7 Hartford-Bristol-Middleton-New Britian, CT 23,372 35,919 7,155 
8 Hickory-Morgantown, NC 4,985 17,691 3,784 
9 Houma-Thibodouw, LA 8,495 4,245 933 
10 Jackson, MS 10,617 18,813 4,601 
11 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN/VA 13,299 14,914 3,220 
12 Lafayette, LA 7,546 11,359 2,245 
13 Lexington-Fayette, KY 8,318 10,066 2,470 
14 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 7,149 16,778 3,376 
15 Manchester, NH 4,301 3,874 824 
16 Nashua, NH 3,820 4,044 878 
17 New Bedford, MA 6,599 9,148 1,840 
18 New Haven-Meriden, CT 9,429 16,446 3,371 
19 New London-Norwich, CT/RI 6,253 0 0 
20  Providence-Fall River-Pawtuckett, MA 12,043 50,107 9,943 
21 Pawtucket-Woonsocket-Attleboro, RI-MA 5,517 0 0 
22 Reno, NV 5,937 17,297 4,005 
23 Roanoke, VA 5,119 11,423 2,431 
24 St. Cloud, MN 7,178 10,017 2,116 
25 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 30,163 54,438 13,767 
26  Springfield, IL 10,230 4,739 1,070 
27 Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee,MA 17,759 28,508 5,766 
28 Stamford, CT 4,579 16,797 3,478 
29 Waterbury, CT 4,657 5,182 1,019 
30 Worcester, MA 14,192 13,917 2,939 
 
Total 4,715,736 4,615,246 918,128 
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Table A.2 Observations to Construct Instrument and Main Explanatory Variable in 1990 Sample 
(Selected) 
Within MA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Metropolitan area  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Abilene, TX 1,794 0.07 0.07 
Akron, OH 8,705 0.35 0.42 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 13,539 0.55 0.97 
………    
Yuma, AZ 1,308 0.05 100.00 
Total 2,480,945 100.00 
 
Groups defined 
by sex, education 
and experience 
New York-Northeastern NJ  
(Biggest MA, 9.08%)  Yuma, AZ (Smallest MA, 0.05) 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 
 
1,837 0.82 0.82 
 
27 2.06 2.06 
2 
 
3,057 1.36 2.17 
 
54 4.13 6.19 
3 
 
3,180 1.41 3.58 
 
31 2.37 8.56 
……         
32 
 
3,361 1.49 100 
 
10 0.76 100 
Total 
 
225,388 100   1,308 100  
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